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96-679 PISCATAWAY TOWNSHIP BOARD OF EDUCATION V. TAXMAN
Ruling below (CA 3 (en banc), 91 F.3d 1547, 65 LW 2118, 71 FEP Cases 848):
Public school district's layoff of white teacher while retaining black teacher of equal
seniority and qualifications, pursuant to affirmative action policy designed to achieve racial
diversity in workplace rather than to remedy past discrimination or redress racial imbalance
in workplace, violates Title VII of 1964 Civil Rights Act; although white teacher cannot
be returned to position that she held prior to layoff-- one of virtually precise equality with
black teacher of equal seniority and qualifications who was retained during layoff period
-- district court's award of full back pay for entire layoff period most closely approximates
conditions that would have prevailed in absence of discrimination and is therefore affirmed.
Questions presented: (1) Does Title VII of 1964 Civil Rights Act, as amended, permit
employers to take race into account for purposes other than remedying past discrimination?
(2) If so, is fostering diversity among high school faculty lawful purpose? (3) Assuming
lawful purpose, does consideration of race in layoff decision invariably violate rights of
affected non-minority employees? (4) May district court award full back pay to Title VII
plaintiff who stands no more than even chance of securing, or retaining, employment?
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UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff,
V.
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the TOWNSHIP OF PISCATAWAY, Defendant.
Sharon TAXMAN, Plaintiff-Intervenor,
V.
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the TOWNSHIP OF PISCATAWAY, Defendant.
United States District Court, New Jersey
832 F.Supp.836
Sept. 10, 1993.
BARRY, District Judge.
This case involves a challenge by the United States, as plaintiff, and Sharon Taxman, as intervenor, to an
affirmative action plan adopted by the Board of Education of Piscataway Township ("Board"). Plaintiff and
Taxman claim that Taxman, a white female employed as a teacher by the Board in the Business Education
Department of Piscataway High School, was laid off instead of Debra Williams, a black female employed as a
teacher in the same department, solely on the basis of race. Both the plaintiff and Taxman have brought claims
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and Taxman has brought an additional claim under the New Jersey
Law Against Discrimination ("NJLAD"). Discovery has closed and there are few factual disputes between the
parties. The Board has moved for summary judgment and plaintiff and Taxman have cross-moved for partial
summary judgment as to liability. Because there is no legal justification for the race-conscious affirmative action
plan at issue in this case and because that plan unnecessarily trammels on the rights of nonminorities, the Board's
motion for summary judgment will be denied and plaintiff and Taxman's cross-motion will be granted.
II. BACKGROUND
The relevant facts are almost entirely undisputed and, except where otherwise cited, have been stipulated by the
parties.
A. The Board's Affirmative Action Program and Policy
In May, 1975, the New Jersey State Board of Education adopted a regulation requiring each school district "to
develop a policy of equal education opportunity" and adopt by board resolution two affirmative action plans, one
pertaining to classroom practices and the other pertaining to employment practices. Pursuant to this regulation,
the Piscataway Township Board adopted a program called "Affirmative Action Program to Eliminate
Discrimination on the Basis of Sex, Race, Religion or National Origin". The program contained the following
"Statement of Purpose":
The Piscataway Township Board of Education believes that each student is entitled to equal educational
opportunity and that all qualified persons are entitled to equal employment opportunities.
The affirmative action program is a set of specific procedures to which the Board of Education commits
itself to apply every good faith effort. The objective of these procedures is to provide equal educational
opportunity for students and equal employment opportunity for employees and prospective employees.
The basic purpose of the program is to make a concentrated effort to attract women candidates for
administrative and supervisory positions and minority personnel for all positions so that their
qualifications can be evaluated along with other candidates. In all cases, the most qualified candidate will
be recommended for appointment. However, when candidates appear to be of equal qualification,
candidates meeting the criteria of the affirmative action program will be recommended.
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There is no dispute that the Board did not adopt its 1975 Affirmative Action Program in order to remedy the
results of prior discrimination or to rectify an identified under-representation of minorities within the Piscataway
school system. No charges of race based discrimination had been filed with any state or federal agency against the
Board or any of its employees prior to the adoption of the 1975 Affirmative Action Program. Indeed, there is not
even a suggestion that the Board had ever intentionally discriminated against any employee or applicant for
employment on the basis of race. Moreover, at the time the Affirmative Action Program was adopted, the statistical
reports required by the New Jersey Department of Education showed no under representation of black employees
in the reporting categories required by the State.
In 1976, the Board adopted an addendum to the Affirmative Action Program. This document, entitled
"Employment Practices Addendum", contained an analysis of minority and female employment across various job
categories in Piscataway public schools. With respect to the job category of "professionals", which includes
teachers, the statistics listed in the document indicate that while minorities comprised 7.4% of the statewide pool
of persons with the requisite skills for professional positions, 10% of the Board's work force in this category were
minorities. The document concludes that "the Piscataway School District is not under-utilizing Minorities in any
job category when compared with EEOC Labor Force Area data".
In April, 1983, the Board adopted an affirmative action policy. The stated purpose of this policy, entitled
"Affirmative Action--Employment Practices", was as follows:
This policy ensures equal employment opportunity for all persons and prohibits discrimination in employment
because of sex, race, color, creed, religion, handicap, domicile, marital status, or national origin. In all cases,
the most qualified candidate will be recommended for appointment. However, when candidates appear to be
of equal qualification, candidates meeting the criteria of the affirmative action program will be recommended.
In January, 1985, the Board adopted a second addendum to its 1975 program. It compared the percentage of
available minorities in the Middlesex County labor market with the percentage of minorities employed by the Board
in each job category. The comparison of the percentages for the job category of "Educational Professionals", 90%
of which were teachers, revealed that while 5.8% of the available labor market in Middlesex County was black,
9.5% of the educational professionals employed by the Board were black. Moreover, the addendum's analysis of
undemtilization in each of the job categories by race, national origin, and sex indicated that because the percentage
of black educational professionals employed by the Board exceeded the percentage of blacks in the Middlesex
County labor market, there was no underutilization of blacks. Thus, the Board did not establish any goal with
respect to hiring additional black teachers.
B. The Decision to Terminate Taxman
Sharon Taxman, a white female, was hired by the Board as a business education teacher commencing
September 1, 1980. Taxman had a bachelor's degree, three years prior teaching experience, and an instructional
certificate from the New Jersey State Department of Education which authorized her to teach courses in the areas
of secretarial studies, bookkeeping, accounting, typing, and general business. Debra Williams, a black female, was
also hired by the Board commencing September 1, 1980. At the time she was hired, Williams had a bachelor's
degree, one year prior teaching experience, and an instructional certificate authorizing her to teach courses in the
areas of typing and secretarial studies. In 1985, Williams became certified to teach courses in business education.
Both Taxman and Williams remained employed by the Board in the Business Education Department at Piscataway
High School from the 1980-81 school year through the 1988-89 school year. As a result, the Board's calculation
of seniority for Taxman and Williams indicated that each had nine years seniority in typewriting and secretarial
studies, while in general business and bookkeeping and accounting Taxman had nine years seniority compared to
Williams' four years and three months seniority. The bottom line is undisputed: Taxman and Williams were in
a seniority tie.
In the Spring of 1989, Burton Edelchick, the Superintendent of Schools, recommended to the Board that it
reduce the teaching staff in its Business Education Department. As Superintendent of Schools, Edelchick was in
charge of the day-to-day activities of the Piscataway School District. By letter dated April 24, 1989, Gordon Moore,
the Board's Director of Personnel, advised Taxman that the Board would be discussing a reduction in force within
the Business Education Department for the 1989-90 school year and that, because she was tied in seniority with
another teacher, her employment could possibly be terminated.
49
At private sessions on April 27 and May 18, 1989, the Board discussed Edelchick's recommendation that the
teaching staff in the Business Education Department be reduced. At the May 18th meeting, the Board also
discussed possible methods of breaking the tie in seniority between Taxman and Williams. Although the option
of breaking the tie by drawing lots, as had been done to break all such ties in the past, was considered, that option
was rejected. Edelchick recommended to the Board that it use the 1983 Affirmative Action policy as a tiebreaker.
Edelchick's recommendation was based on his belief that Taxman and Williams were tied in seniority and equally
qualified, and because Williams was the only black teacher in the Business Education Department. The Board
informally decided to use the 1983 Affirmative Action policy to break the tie.
At its regular public meeting on May 22, 1989, the Board formally voted to abolish one teaching position in
the Business Education Department of Piscataway High School. Using its 1983 Affirmative Action policy as the
seniority tie-breaking method, it then voted to terminate Taxman effective June 30, 1989.
It is undisputed that when the Board terminated Taxman in May, 1989, it had no specific intent to remedy any
prior discriminatory act, practice, or pattern. It is similarly undisputed that had Taxman been retained and Williams
been terminated, no underrepresentation of blacks in the teaching work force as a whole would have resulted.
III. DISCUSSION
Summary judgment will be granted only where "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law". Which facts are "material" depends on the
substantive law being applied. Thus, in order to be "material", a fact must be such that it could affect the outcome
under the governing substantive law. In addition, a factual dispute will not preclude summary judgment unless it
is "genuine", that is, the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.
If the evidence of the nonmovant is merely colorable or not particularly probative, summary judgment may be
granted. Finally, in passing on such a motion, the court is not at liberty to weigh evidence or resolve factual
disputes. Rather, the court is bound to view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw
all reasonable inferences in that party's favor.
The claims of employment discrimination on the basis of race brought by plaintiff and Taxman are properly
analyzed under the framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green. There is no dispute that plaintiff
and Taxman have established a prima facie case, indeed, the Board's concession that it took race into account in
making the employment decision is sufficient in and of itself to establish a prima facie case. The burden, therefore,
shifts to the Board to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action. "The existence of an
affirmative action plan provides such a rationale". The Board having met its burden of production, the burden
shifts back to plaintiff and Taxman to show that the plan is invalid. Plaintiff and Taxman at all times bear the
burden of proving the plan's invalidity.
A. Supreme Court Authority on Reverse Discrimination Under Title VII: Weber and Johnson
This court's analysis of the Board's affirmative action plan must begin with the Supreme Court's decision in
United Steelworkers of America v. Weber. The Court in Weber considered the legality of an affirmative action plan
which was adopted pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement. The plan reserved for black employees 50% of
the openings in an in-plant training program designed to train unskilled production workers to become craftworkers
until such time as the percentage of black craftworkers was commensurate with the percentage of blacks in the labor
force. Aside from the 50% of the openings reserved for black employees, workers were selected for the training
program on the basis of seniority. A white employee instituted a class action complaining that because the plan
resulted in the admission to the training program of black employees with less seniority than some white employees
who were denied admission, it violated Title VII.
The Supreme Court characterized the issue before it as follows: "The only question before us is the narrow
statutory issue of whether Title VII forbids private employers and unions from voluntarily agreeing upon bona fide
affirmative action plans that accord racial preferences in the manner and for the purpose provided in the
Kaiser-USWA plan". The Court rejected the employees' narrow, literal reading of Title VII and read that statute
in light of its legislative history and the historical context in which it arose to conclude that it was not intended to
be an absolute prohibition against all private, voluntary, race- conscious affirmative action programs.
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Having concluded that Title VII does not prohibit all voluntary, race- conscious affirmative action programs
by private employers, the Court stressed that its inquiry was limited in scope: "We need not today define in detail
the line of demarcation between permissible and impermissible affirmative action plans" In determining that the
specific plan at issue was permissible under the statute, the Court noted that the plan served the same purpose as
Title VII: "to break down old patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy" The Court also opined that the plan
did not "unnecessarily trammel" the interests of white employees as it did not require that white workers be
terminated and replaced with black workers or create an absolute bar to the advancement of white employees. In
addition, the plan was a temporary measure designed to eliminate a racial imbalance rather than to maintain a
racial balance. The Court concluded that the plan "falls within the area of discretion left by Title VII to the private
sector voluntarily to adopt affirmative action plans designed to eliminate conspicuous racial imbalance in
traditionally segregated job categories".
The Supreme Court entertained a similar question with respect to a public employer in Johnson. At the outset,
the majority rejected the position advocated by Justice Scalia in dissent that the obligations of a public employer
under Title VII are the same as its obligations under the Constitution. The Court thus rejected the notion that the
strict scrutiny under which constitutional challenges to affirmative action plans are analyzed, should likewise
govern challenges to public employers' plans pursuant to Title VII. Having declined to apply strict scrutiny, the
Court considered the affirmative action plan before it in light of Weber.
The Johnson Court had before it an affirmative action plan adopted by the Transportation Agency of Santa
Clara County, California. As relevant to the case before the Court, the plan authorized the agency to consider as
one factor the sex of applicants for promotion to positions within traditionally segregated job classifications in
which women had been under represented. The petitioner in Johnson was a male employee who had applied for
the promotional position of road dispatcher, which position was eventually given to a woman applicant. Both the
petitioner and the woman who was promoted were deemed well qualified for the position, and petitioner had scored
slightly higher in the first round interview. The decision maker for the agency indicated that in reaching the
decision to promote the woman candidate, he had considered the candidates' qualifications, backgrounds, test
scores, and expertise as well as affirmative action.
The majority in Johnson closely tracked the Court's decision in Weber in considering whether the affirmative
action plan at issue was lawful. The Court considered first whether the plan was justified by a "manifest
imbalance" such that women were under represented in "traditionally segregated job categories", noting that this
requirement ensures that affirmative action plans will be consistent with Title VII's purpose of eliminating the
effects of employment discrimination and will not unduly infringe on the rights of nonminority employees. Noting
that in addition to its long term objective of a work force that mirrored the percentage of women in the area labor
market, the plan also mandated that annual goals for female hiring be formulated in light of such factors as the
number of openings and the availability of qualified women in the labor force, goals more properly categorized as
aspirations than quotas, the court found the requisite manifest imbalance to justify an affirmative action plan.
Important, too, to this finding was the fact that blind hiring based on statistics alone was not authorized under the
plan. Rather, the plan required that female applicants' qualifications for particular positions be taken into account
in setting hiring goals as well as in making hiring decisions.
The Johnson Court's second inquiry was whether the plan under scrutiny unnecessarily trammeled the rights
of male employees or created an absolute bar to the advancement of male employees. The Court found that
numerous factors militated in favor of a conclusion that the plan also satisfied this prong of Weber. First, sex was
but one of numerous factors considered in deciding which employee to promote. Second, the petitioner had no
legitimate, firmly rooted expectation in being promoted. Third, the plan was implemented merely to attain, as
opposed to maintain, a balanced work force. Finally, the court did not find troublesome the plan's lack of an
express assurance that it was temporary because the agency's demonstrably moderate and gradual approach to
eliminating the imbalance in its work force combined with its commitment to attaining a balance were sufficient
to indicate to the Court that the plan was only a temporary measure. Finding that both concerns expressed in
Weber had been satisfied, the Court concluded that the agency's plan did not run afoul of Title VII.
The Court's holdings in Weber and Johnson teach that the inquiry in determining whether a voluntary,
race-conscious employment decision violates Title VII is twofold. Drawing on the structure of Weber 's analysis,
the Court in Johnson stated the first prong of this inquiry as follows: "[W]e must first examine whether [the
employment] decision [challenged] was made pursuant to a plan prompted by concerns similar to those of the
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employer in Weber" This prong can be more simply described as an inquiry into the purpose or purposes for
which a particular plan was adopted. The second prong, as expressed by the Johnson Court, is "whether the effect
of the Plan on males and nonminorities is comparable to the effect of the plan in [Weber I" This step requires a
determination as to whether the particular plan "unnecessarily trammels" the rights of male and nonminority
employees. Each of these concerns will be addressed separately.
B. The Purpose of the Plan
Weber 's discussion of what it found to be the permissible purposes for the affirmative action plan there at issue
was brief: "The purposes of the plan mirror those of the statute. Both were designed to break down old patterns
of racial segregation and hierarchy. Both were structured to 'open employment opportunities for Negroes in
occupations which have been traditionally closed to them' " What the Weber Court found sufficient was followed
and expounded upon in Johnson. In both Weber and Johnson, the Court approved the affirmative action plans at
issue based on their express and substantiated purpose of remedying an underrepresentation of women or
minorities.
In the wake of Weber and Johnson, lower court opinions considering voluntary, race-conscious affirmative
action plans challenged under Title VII have construed the purpose prong of the inquiry strictly within the
parameters set by the Supreme Court. Thus, the Tenth Circuit held that "[tlhe purpose of race-conscious
affirmative action must be to remedy the effects of past discrimination against a disadvantaged group that itself has
been the victim of discrimination" The school district in Cunico defended its decision to retain a less senior black
social worker instead of a more senior white social worker by claiming that it had a compelling interest in retaining
the former because he was the district's only black administrator. The Cunico court opined that the school district's
interest in retaining at least one black administrator is an availing Title VII defense only to the extent that it is "a
necessary measure to remedy past discrimination". The court went on to consider whether there was direct
evidence of past or present discrimination or a statistical imbalance which could support an inference of
discrimination. Finding neither of these, the court concluded that the purpose prong of Weber and Johnson had
not been satisfied and that, therefore, the plan was invalid.
The only court in this circuit to consider this question similarly found a manifest imbalance to be a sine qua non
for a lawful affirmative action plan. In finding that the affirmative action plan under scrutiny was not adopted to
remedy past discrimination, the court held that "the plaintiff has succeeded in showing that the reason for the
promotion of [the minority employee] over the [white] plaintiff, the execution of an affirmative action plan, was
merely a pretext because the manifest imbalance required to be present before the use of an affirmative action plan
is permissible did not exist"
As the stipulated facts in this case make abundantly clear, the Board does not even attempt to show that its
affirmative action plan was adopted to remedy past discrimination or as the result of a manifest imbalance in the
employment of minorities because it concedes that it would be unable to make such a showing. Its concessions that
it knows of no prior discrimination by it or charges of discrimination against it in the hiring of teachers and that
there has been and is no minority underrepresentation or underutilization, as well as the statistical analyses which
demonstrate that the percentage of minority teachers employed by the Board has consistently exceeded the
percentage of qualified minorities in the work force, foreclose any argument that the plan was adopted for any sort
of remedial purpose as contemplated by Weber, Johnson, and the lower court authority following those decisions.
Recognizing this, the Board seeks to justify its affirmative action plan not by reference to a remedial purpose,
but by asserting that the plan was adopted for the nonremedial purpose of promoting racial diversity "for education's
sake" or "as an educational goal" in a department, but not in the Board's teacher work force, with an otherwise all
white faculty. Conceding that there is no authority approving of such a purpose to support an affirmative action
plan under Title VII, the Board would have the court infer the propriety of this purpose from fragments of other
authority. A close look at the case law and the purpose of Title VII, however, reveals that laudable as this purpose
may be, it cannot support a race-conscious affirmative action plan.
The Board argues that the role of education in society and the especial care with which courts have treated
issues pertaining to education and schools distinguish this case--and, more particularly, the Board's asserted
purpose for the affirmative action plan--from the substantial body of authority under which its plan would be
invalid. To be sure, the quality of education is a paramount public concern and on numerous occasions the
Supreme Court has commented on the crucial and sensitive nature of public schools in our society.
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It should initially be noted that the court is well aware of the distinction between the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VII in this arena. It is clear after Croson that a majority of the Supreme
Court endorses the use of strict scrutiny in reviewing affirmative action plans challenged, unlike the plan here,
under the Fourteenth Amendment. Title VII evokes an entirely different mode of analysis. As previously noted,
cases considering affirmative action plans under Title VII have not strayed from the "manifest racial imbalance"
language of Weber and Johnson. While the heretofore strict adherence in Title VII cases to approving only plans
with remedial purposes is certainly a basis upon which to declare the Board's plan invalid, the Board's argument
that diversity for education's sake should also justify an affirmative action plan challenged under Title VII merits
some discussion. The absence of Title VII case law in this regard, however, and the making of new law which
adoption of the Board's asserted purpose would engender, requires that the assessment of permissible and
impermissible purposes for affirmative action consider the more varied analysis undertaken under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Parenthetically, the court stresses that the citation of these authorities is not an implicit endorsement
of either strict scrutiny or an expansion of the law; rather, the consideration of how certain purposes have been
received provides a useful--and, indeed, the only--judicial benchmark by which to judge the Board's asserted
purpose.
Remedying specific acts of past discrimination is an interest sufficient to permit race-based affirmative action.
In the Fourteenth Amendment context, it appears that this interest is considered a "compelling government
interest" Moreover, it is beyond question that remedying specific past discrimination is a sufficient justification
under Title VII for an affirmative action plan. Equally clear, of course, is that this justification is not asserted here.
On the other hand, the Supreme Court has repeatedly determined that in the Fourteenth Amendment context
general societal discrimination is a purpose which is "too amorphous a basis for imposing a racially classified
remedy"
Another purported justification for affirmative action plans which has been considered and rejected by the
Supreme Court in the Fourteenth Amendment context is the "role model" theory. The defendant board of education
in Wygant attempted to justify its adoption of an affirmative action plan by asserting that it had a need for more
minority faculty role models for its minority students. In addition to reaffirming that general societal
discrimination, without more, cannot justify race-based remedial measures under the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Court debunked the role model theory on several other grounds. First, it noted that this justification had no logical
stopping point. "The role model theory allows the Board to engage in discriminatory hiring and layoff practices
long past the point required by any legitimate remedial purpose". The Wygant plurality further found that because
the role model theory attempts to tie the percentage of minority teachers to the percentage of minority students, it
could be used to justify a small percentage of minority teachers by reference to a small percentage of minority
students--a result wholly incompatible with the obligation of public employers to remedy past discriminatory
practices. Moreover, the plurality found that taken to its extreme, the role model theory could lead to the very
segregation that was rejected in Brown v. Board of Education.
The Board has attempted to go beyond where these and other cases have gone and weave together a variety of
judicial statements to support its theory that affirmative action for the purpose of racial diversity within a high
school faculty is permissible under Title VII. Chief among the sources to which the Board points is the statement
of Justice Powell in Bakke that the attainment of a diverse student body is a "constitutionally permissible goal for
an institution of higher education"
More recently, the Court has held that benign race conscious measures mandated by Congress could be
supported by the "important governmental objective" of enhancing broadcast programming diversity. In approving
such diversity as an "important governmental objective", the Court reaffirmed Justice Powell's statement in Bakke
that a diverse student body is a constitutionally permissible goal on which a race-conscious admissions program
can be based. Key to the Court's consideration of the race-conscious measures at issue in Metro Broadcasting was
the fact that the measures were mandated by Congress and, therefore, viewed with the deference appropriately
accorded Congress as a co-equal branch of the federal government charged with legislating to enforce the equal
protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment. Based on the institutional deference due Congress, the Court
applied the "important governmental objectives/substantial relation" test rather than traditional strict scrutiny.
While the case law suggests that the Supreme Court considers faculty diversity to be at least a laudable goal,
the Board's position must be rejected. It is sheer speculation as to whether the Court may one day extend its reading
of Title VII to encompass a race conscious affirmative action plan in the absence of a manifest imbalance in the
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work force because of a desire to achieve faculty diversity. The Board has cited no authority that has been willing
to stray so far from the holdings of Weber and Johnson, and this court will decline the invitation to do so. Based
on the conclusion that the purpose asserted for the Board's affirmative action plan, i.e. faculty diversity "for
education's sake", is not a permissible purpose under controlling Title VII case law, the court holds that the Board's
plan is unlawful.
C. The Plan's Effect on Nonminorities
Even were the court to find that the Board adopted the plan for a purpose that is permissible under Title VII,
the plan would be struck down under the second prong of Weber and Johnson. After finding the purpose of the
plan at issue to be acceptable, the Court in Weber found that the plan did not "unnecessarily trammel the interests
of the white employees". In this regard, the Court noted that the plan (1) did not require the discharge of white
workers to be replaced by black workers; (2) did not create an absolute bar to the advancement of white employees;
and (3) was a temporary measure not intended to maintain a racial balance but, rather, to eliminate a manifest
imbalance. Based on these criteria, the Court concluded that the voluntarily adopted race- conscious measures were
permissible under Title VII. Johnson reaffirmed this analysis in the course of determining whether an affirmative
action plan infringed too greatly on the rights of those who did not benefit by it.
Considering these factors with reference to the plan at issue here, it is apparent that plan simply cannot pass
muster under the second prong of Weber and Johnson. The Board's plan certainly does not require that
nonminorities be fired and minority teachers be hired in their place. Nor can it be said that the plan requires blind
hiring or imposes a quota system on the hiring of teachers by the Board. In this respect, the plan avoids two of the
potential pitfalls cited in Weber and Johnson.
The plan at issue, however, does not compare so favorably with respect to the other two factors relevant to
whether an affirmative action plan unnecessarily trammels the rights of nonminorities. First, in contrast to
Johnson, where the plan pertained to promotions, the Board's minority preference applies to layoff decisions. While
there may be no firmly rooted expectation in obtaining a promotion, there is clearly a legitimate and firmly rooted
expectation in continued employment. There is no contention that the Board determined to eliminate a teaching
spot in the Business Education Department of Piscataway High School because of Taxman's race. However, as a
matter of common sense and of case law, the burden imposed on those not favored under the plan, is significantly
greater and more concentrated where the employment decision reached as a result of the plan is a layoff rather than
a promotion or an initial hiring decision.
Even more damaging to the Board's plan is the fact that there is no indication that it is temporary. The Court
in Weber emphasized that the plan at issue was not overly intrusive to nonminorities because it was, by its very
nature, temporary. The preferential selection of craft trainees in Weber was to cease as soon as the percentage of
trainees approximated the percentage of blacks in the local labor force. The preference thus had a discrete and
discernable end. In Johnson, the Court recognized that the plan at issue there had no such discernable ending
because it did not specify any percentage comparison to be reached. Nonetheless, the Court was sufficiently
comforted by the fact that the plan was intended to attain, not maintain, a balanced work force and by the fact that
"substantial evidence show[ed] that the Agency ha[d] sought to take a moderate, gradual approach to eliminating
the imbalance in its work force" Based on this, the Court found "ample assurance that the Agency does not seek
to use its Plan to maintain a permanent racial and sexual balance".
Significantly, the Board does not even suggest that its plan is temporary and there is no indication that the plan
is to be reassessed with any regularity or, for that matter, at all. The program embodying the racial preference at
issue was first adopted in 1975, became policy in 1983, and, of course, remains--until now-in effect. While a long
duration does not necessarily indicate permanence, the Board's failure to contest the assertion that the plan is not
temporary is telling. Indeed, rather than arguing that the plan is temporary, the Board contends that because it was
not adopted for a remedial purpose, whether it is temporary or permanent is irrelevant in assessing whether the plan
unnecessarily trammels the rights of nonminorities.
This contention finds no support in the case law. Moreover, it defies common sense that an affirmative action
plan adopted for, arguendo, the permissible purpose of increasing diversity among a public school's faculty could
be permitted to exist without end. If the goal of the plan is to enrich the educational experience of students by
employing a more diverse faculty, this goal will be achieved at some point. What that point will be, however, is
wholly unclear for the "diversity" which is sought is nowhere defined. Is a diverse faculty one which is 10%
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minority, 20% minority, or 50% minority? In this connection, there is no finding by the Board or any other
authority that the faculty as it now exists is not already "diverse".
Metro Broadcasting, in which the Supreme Court upheld a minority preference plan implemented for the
purpose of achieving broadcasting diversity, does not support the Board's argument. First, the Court paid deference
to the legislative function of Congress as a co-equal branch of government and noted that "the Commission adopted
and Congress endorsed minority ownership preferences only after long study and painstaking consideration of all
available alternatives". Conspicuously absent here is evidence that the Board has tried or considered alternative
and less burdensome means to achieve diversity in its faculty. Even more damning to the Board's argument,
however, is the fact that the Court in Metro Broadcasting relied on the limited duration of the congressionally
approved race preference plan in finding it permissible.
The Board's plan has none of the limitations that has been deemed necessary in all other instances in which
race-conscious plans have been upheld and there is no suggestion to the contrary. An affirmative action plan which
grants a preference based on race cannot be boundless, even under the farthest reaches of the law as it is today.
Therefore, even if faculty diversity were a purpose on which a race-conscious plan could be based, the plan
presented here would be struck down as overly intrusive to the rights of nonminorities.
IV. CONCLUSION
The court concludes that the affirmative action plan adopted by the Board and pursuant to which Taxman was
laid off was adopted for an imperniissible purpose. The court further concludes that even were the asserted purpose
legally sufficient to justify the Board's plan, the plan would be unlawful because it "unnecessarily trammels" the
rights of nonninorities. Finding that no genuine issue of fact for trial on liability remains and that the Board's
affirmative action plan is unlawful under Title VII and the NJLAD, partial summary judgment as to liability in
favor of the United States and Taxman will be granted. Concomitantly, the Board's motion for summary judgment
will be denied.
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MANSMANN, Circuit Judge.
In this Title VII matter, we must determine whether the Board of Education of the Township of Piscataway
violated that statute when it made race a factor in selecting which of two equally qualified employees to lay off.
Specifically, we must decide whether Title VII permits an employer with a racially balanced work force to grant
a non-remedial racial preference in order to promote "racial diversity".
It is clear that the language of Title VII is violated when an employer makes an employment decision based
upon an employee's race. The Supreme Court determined in United Steelworkers v. Weber, , however, that Title
VII's prohibition against racial discrimination is not violated by affirmative action plans which first, "have purposes
that mirror those of the statute" and second, do not "unnecessarily trammel the interests of the [non-minority]
employees,"
We hold that Piscataway's affirmative action policy is unlawful because it fails to satisfy either prong of Weber.
Given the clear antidiscrimination mandate of Title VII, a non-remedial affirmative action plan, even one with a
laudable purpose, cannot pass muster. We will affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment to Sharon
Taxman.
I.
In 1975, the Board of Education of the Township of Piscataway, New Jersey, developed an affirmative action
policy applicable to employment decisions. The Board's Affirmative Action Program, a 52-page document, was
originally adopted in response to a regulation promulgated by the New Jersey State Board of Education. That
regulation directed local school boards to adopt "affirmative action programs," to address employment as well as
school and classroom practices and to ensure equal opportunity to all persons regardless of race, color, creed,
religion, sex or national origin. In 1983 the Board also adopted a one page "Policy", entitled "Affirmative Action--
Employment Practices."
The 1975 document states that the purpose of the Program is "to provide equal educational opportunity for
students and equal employment opportunity for employees and prospective employees," and "to make a concentrated
effort to attract ... minority personnel for all positions so that their qualifications can be evaluated along with other
candidates." The 1983 document states that its purpose is to "ensure[ ] equal employment opportunity ... and
prohibit [ ] discrimination in employment because of [, inter alia,] race...."
The operative language regarding the means by which affirmative-action goals are to be furthered is identical
in the two documents. "In all cases, the most qualified candidate will be recommended for appointment. However,
when candidates appear to be of equal qualification, candidates meeting the criteria of the affirmative action
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program will be recommended." The phrase "candidates meeting the criteria of the affirmative action program"
refers to members of racial, national origin or gender groups identified as minorities for statistical reporting
purposes by the New Jersey State Department of Education, including Blacks. The 1983 document also clarifies
that the affirmative action program applies to "every aspect of employment including ... layoffs...."
The Board's affirmative action policy did not have "any remedial purpose"; it was not adopted "with the
intention of remedying the results of any prior discrimination or identified underrepresentation of minorities within
the Piscataway Public School System." At all relevant times, Black teachers were neither "under represented" nor
"underutilized" in the Piscataway School District work force.
A.
In May, 1989, the Board accepted a recommendation from the Superintendent of Schools to reduce the teaching
staff in the Business Department at Piscataway High School by one. At that time, two of the teachers in the
department were of equal seniority, both having begun their employment with the Board on the same day nine years
earlier. One of those teachers was intervenor plaintiff Sharon Taxman, who is White, and the other was Debra
Williams, who is Black. Williams was the only minority teacher among the faculty of the Business Department.
Decisions regarding layoffs by New Jersey school boards are highly circumscribed by state law; nontenured
faculty must be laid off first, and layoffs among tenured teachers in the affected subject area or grade level must
proceed in reverse order of seniority. Seniority for this purpose is calculated according to specific guidelines set
by state law. Thus, local boards lack discretion to choose between employees for layoff, except in the rare instance
of a tie in seniority between the two or more employees eligible to fill the last remaining position.
The Board determined that it was facing just such a rare circumstance in deciding between Taxman and
Williams. In prior decisions involving the layoff of employees with equal seniority, the Board had broken the tie
through "a random process which included drawing numbers out of a container, drawing lots or having a lottery."
In none of those instances, however, had the employees involved been of different races.
In light of the unique posture of the layoff decision, Superintendent of Schools Burton Edelchick recommended
to the Board that the affirmative action plan be invoked in order to determine which teacher to retain.
Superintendent Edelchick made this recommendation "because he believed Ms. Williams and Ms. Taxman were
tied in seniority, were equally qualified, and because Ms. Williams was the only Black teacher in the Business
Education Department."
While the Board recognized that it was not bound to apply the affirmative action policy, it made a discretionary
decision to invoke the policy to break the tie between Williams and Taxman. As a result, the Board "voted to
terminate the employment of Sharon Taxman, effective June 30, 1988...."
B.
Following the Board's decision, Taxman filed a charge of employment discrimination with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission. Attempts at conciliation were unsuccessful, and the United States filed suit
under Title VII against the Board in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey. Taxman
intervened, asserting claims under both Title VII and the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (NJLAD).
Following discovery, the Board moved for summary judgment and the United States and Taxman cross-moved
for partial summary judgment only as to liability. The district court denied the Board's motion and granted partial
summary judgment to the United States and Taxman, holding the Board liable under both statutes for
discrimination on the basis of race.
A trial proceeded on the issue of damages. By this time, Taxman had been rehired by the Board and thus her
reinstatement was not an issue. The court awarded Taxman damages in the amount of $134,014.62 for backpay,
fringe benefits and prejudgment interest under Title VII. A jury awarded an additional $10,000 for emotional
suffering under the NJLAD. The district court denied the United States' request for a broadly worded injunction
against future discrimination, finding that there was no likelihood that the conduct at issue would recur, but it did
order the Board to give Taxman full seniority reflecting continuous employment from 1980. Additionally, the court
dismissed Taxman's claim for punitive damages under the NJLAD.
The Board appealed, contending that the district court erred in granting Taxman summary judgment as to
liability. The Board also contends, in the alternative, that the court erred in awarding Taxman 100% backpay and
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in awarding prejudgment interest at the IRS rate rather than under 28 U.S.C. § 1961. Taxman cross-appealed,
contending that the district court erred in dismissing her claim for punitive damages. Subsequently, the United
States sought leave to file a brief as amicus curiae in support of reversal of the judgment, representing that it could
no longer support the judgment of the district court. By order of November 17, 1995, we denied the United States'
request. We treated the position of the United States at the original argument before this court on January 24, 1995,
as a motion to withdraw as a party, which we granted. Thus, the only parties before us on this appeal are the Board
and Taxman.
This court has jurisdiction over the appeals under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review of the district court's decision
on summary judgment is plenary.
II.
In relevant part, Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer "to discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment" or "to limit, segregate, or classify his
employees ... in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or
otherwise affect his status as an employee" on the basis of "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." For a time,
the Supreme Court construed this language as absolutely prohibiting discrimination in employment, neither
requiring nor permitting any preference for any group.
In 1979, however, the Court interpreted the statute's "antidiscriminatory strategy" in a "fundamentally different
way", holding in the seminal case of United Steelworkers v. Weber, that Title VII's prohibition against racial
discrimination does not condemn all voluntary race-conscious affirmative action plans. In Weber, the Court
considered a plan implemented by Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corporation. Prior to 1974, Kaiser hired as
craftworkers only those with prior craft experience. Because they had long been excluded from craft unions, Blacks
were unable to present the credentials required for craft positions. Moreover, Kaiser's hiring practices, although
not admittedly discriminatory with regard to minorities, were questionable. As a consequence, while the local
labor force was about 39% Black, Kaiser's labor force was less than 15% Black and its crafts-work force was less
than 2% Black. In 1974, Kaiser entered into a collective bargaining agreement which contained an affirmative
action plan. The plan reserved 50% of the openings in an in-plant craft-training program for Black employees until
the percentage of Black craft-workers in the plant reached a level commensurate with the percentage of Blacks in
the local labor force. During the first year of the plan's operation, 13 craft-trainees were selected, seven of whom
were Black and six of whom were White.
Thereafter, Brian Weber, a White production worker, filed a class action suit, alleging that the plan unlawfully
discriminated against White employees under Title VII. Relying upon a literal reading of subsections 703(a) and
(d) of the Act, and upon the Court's decision in McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., where the Court held
that Title VII forbids discrimination against Whites as well as Blacks, the plaintiffs argued that it necessarily
followed that the Kaiser plan, which resulted in junior Black employees receiving craft training in preference to
senior White employees, violated Title VII. The district court agreed and entered a judgment in favor of the
plaintiffs; the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.
The Supreme Court, however, reversed, noting initially that although the plaintiffs' argument was not "without
force", it disregarded "the significance of the fact that the Kaiser-USWA plan was an affirmative action plan
voluntarily adopted by private parties to eliminate traditional patterns of racial segregation." The Court then
embarked upon an exhaustive review of Title VII's legislative history and identified Congress' concerns in enacting
Title VII's prohibition against discrimination--the deplorable status of Blacks in the nation's economy, racial
injustice, and the need to open employment opportunities for Blacks in traditionally closed occupations. Against
this background, the Court concluded that Congress could not have intended to prohibit private employers from
implementing programs directed toward the very goal of Title VII--the eradication of discrimination and its effects
from the workplace.
The Court found support for its conclusion in the language and legislative history of section 2000e-2(j) of Title
VII which expressly provides that nothing in the Act requires employers to grant racial preferences. According
to the Court, the opponents of Title VII had raised two arguments: the Act would be construed to impose
obligations upon employers to integrate their work forces through preferential treatment of minorities, and even
without being obligated to do so, employers with racially imbalanced work forces would grant racial preferences.
Since Congress addressed only the first objection and did not specifically prohibit affirmative action efforts in
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section 2000e-2(j), the Court inferred that Congress did not intend that Title VII forbid all voluntary race-conscious
preferences. The Court further reasoned that since Congress also intended in section 2000e-2(j) "to avoid undue
federal regulation of private businesses," a prohibition against all voluntary affirmative action would disserve this
end by "augment[ing] the power of the Federal government and diminish[ing] traditional management
prerogatives...."
The Court then turned to the Kaiser plan in order to determine whether it fell on the "permissible" side of the
"line of demarcation between permissible and impermissible affirmative action plans." The Court upheld the
Kaiser plan because its purpose "mirror[ed] those of the statute" and it did not "unnecessarily trammel the interests
of the [non-minority] employees."
In 1987, the Supreme Court decided a second Title VII affirmative action case, Johnson v. Transportation
Agency, Santa Clara County. There, the Santa Clara County Transit District Board of Supervisors implemented
an affirmative action plan stating that " 'mere prohibition of discriminatory practices [was] not enough to remedy
the effects of past discriminatory practices and to permit attainment of an equitable representation of minorities,
women and handicapped persons.' " The plan noted that women were represented in numbers far less than their
proportion of the available work force in the Agency as a whole and in the skilled craft worker job category relevant
to the case, and observed that a lack of motivation in women to seek training or employment where opportunities
were limited partially explained the underrepresentation. The plan authorized the Agency to consider as one factor
the gender of a qualified candidate in making promotions to positions with a traditionally segregated job
classification in which women were significantly under represented. The plan did not set quotas, but had as its
long-term goal the attainment of a work force whose composition reflected the proportion of women in the area
labor force. Acknowledging the practical difficulties in attaining the long-term goal, including the limited number
of qualified women, the plan counseled that short range goals be established and annually adjusted to serve as
realistic guides for actual employment decisions.
On December 12, 1979, the Agency announced a vacancy for the promotional position of road dispatcher. At
the time, none of the 238 positions in the applicable job category was occupied by a woman. The Agency Director,
authorized to choose any of seven applicants who had been deemed eligible, promoted Diane Joyce, a qualified
woman, over Paul Johnson, a qualified man. As the Agency Director testified: " 'I tried to look at the whole
picture, the combination of her qualifications and Mr. Johnson's qualifications, their test scores, their expertise,
their background, affirmative action matters, things like that ... I believe it was a combination of all those.' "
Johnson sued, alleging that the Agency's employment decision constituted unlawful sex discrimination under
Title VII. Evaluating the plan against the criteria announced in Weber, the district court held that the plan did not
satisfy Weber 's criterion that the plan be temporary. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding
that since the plan provided for the attainment, rather than the maintenance, of a balanced work force, the absence
of an express termination date in the plan was not dispositive of its validity. The court of appeals further held that
the plan had been adopted "to address a conspicuous imbalance in the Agency's work force, and neither
unnecessarily trammeled the rights of other employees, nor created an absolute bar to their advancement."
The Supreme Court affirmed. Declaring its prior analysis in Weber controlling, the Court examined whether
the employment decision at issue "was made pursuant to a plan prompted by concerns similar to those of the
employer in Weber " and whether "the effect of the [pilan on males and nonminorities [was] comparable to the
effects of the plan in that case." The first issue the Court addressed, therefore, was whether "consideration of the
sex of applicants for Skilled Craft jobs was justified by the existence of a 'manifest imbalance' that reflected
underrepresentation of women in 'traditionally segregated job categories.'" Although the Court did not set forth
a quantitative measure for determining what degree of disproportionate representation in an employer's work force
would be sufficient to just affirmative action, it made clear that the terms "manifest imbalance" and "traditionally
segregated job category" were not tantamount to a prima facie case of discrimination against an employer since the
constraints of Title VII and the Federal Constitution on voluntarily adopted affirmative action plans are not
identical. In this regard, the Court further reasoned that requiring an employer in a Title VII affirmative action
case to show that it had discriminated in the past "would be inconsistent with Weber 's focus on statistical
imbalance, and could inappropriately create a significant disincentive for employers to adopt an affirmative action
plan"
Reviewing Agency statistics which showed that women were concentrated in traditionally female jobs and
represented a lower percentage in other jobs than would be expected if traditional segregation had not occurred,
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the Court concluded that the decision to promote Joyce was made pursuant to a plan designed to eliminate work
force imbalances in traditionally segregated job categories and thus satisfied Weber 's first prong. Moving to
Weber's second prong, whether the plan unnecessarily trammeled the rights of male employees, the Court
concluded that the plan passed muster because it authorized merely that consideration be given to affirmative action
concerns when evaluating applicants; gender was a "plus" factor, only one of several criteria that the Agency
Director considered in making his decision; no legitimate, firmly rooted expectation on the part of Johnson was
denied since the Agency Director could have promoted any of the seven candidates classified as eligible; even
though Johnson was refused a promotion, he retained his employment; and the plan was intended to attain a
balanced work force, not to maintain one.
III.
We analyze Taxman's claim of employment discrimination under the approach set forth in McDonnell Douglas
v. Green. Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden of production shifts to the employer to show
a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the decision; an affirmative action plan may be one such reason. When
the employer satisfies this requirement, the burden of production shifts back to the employee to show that the
asserted nondiscriminatory reason is a pretext and that the affirmative action plan is invalid.
For summary judgment purposes, the parties do not dispute that Taxman has established a prima facie case or
that the Board's decision to terminate her was based on its affirmative action policy. The dispositive liability issue,
therefore, is the validity of the Board's policy under Title VII.
IV.
Having reviewed the analytical framework for assessing the validity of an affirmative action plan as established
in United Steelworkers v. Weber and refined in Johnson, we turn to the facts of this case in order to determine
whether the racial diversity purpose of the Board's policy mirrors the purposes of the statute. We look for the
purposes of Title VII in the plain meaning of the Act's provisions and in its legislative history and historical
context.
A.
Title VII was enacted to further two primary goals: to end discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion,
sex or national origin, thereby guaranteeing equal opportunity in the workplace, and to remedy the segregation and
underrepresentation of minorities that discrimination has caused in our Nation's work force.
Title VII's first purpose is set forth in section 2000e-2's several prohibitions, which expressly denounce the
discrimination which Congress sought to end. This antidiscriminatory purpose is also reflected in the Act's
legislative history. In an interpretative memorandum entered into the Congressional Record, Senators Case and
Clark, comanagers of the Senate bill, stated:
To discriminate is to make a distinction, to make a difference in treatment or favor, and those distinctions
or differences in treatment or favor which are prohibited by section 704 are those which are based on any five
of the forbidden criteria: race, color, religion, sex, and national origin. Any other criterion or qualification
for employment is not affected by this title.
... [Title VII] expressly protects the employer's right to insist that any prospective applicant, Negro or white,
must meet the applicable job qualifications. Indeed the very purpose of Title VII is to promote hiring on the
basis of job qualifications, rather than on the basis of race or color.
Title VII's second purpose, ending the segregative effects of discrimination, is revealed in the congressional
debate surrounding the statute's enactment. In Weber, the Court carefully catalogued the comments made by the
proponents of Title VII which demonstrate the Act's remedial concerns.
The significance of this second corrective purpose cannot be overstated. It is only because Title VII was written
to eradicate not only discrimination per se but the consequences of prior discrimination as well, that racial
preferences in the form of affirmative action can co-exist with the Act's antidiscrimination mandate.
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Thus, based on our analysis of Title VII's two goals, we are convinced that unless an affirmative action plan
has a remedial purpose, it cannot be said to mirror the purposes of the statute, and, therefore, cannot satisfy the first
prong of the Weber test.
We see this case as one involving straightforward statutory interpretation controlled by the text and legislative
history of Title VII as interpreted in Weber and Johnson. The statute on its face provides that race cannot be a
factor in employer decisions about hires, promotions, and layoffs, and the legislative history demonstrates that
barring considerations of race from the workplace was Congress' primary objective. If exceptions to this bar are
to be made, they must be made on the basis of what Congress has said. The affirmative action plans at issue in
Weber and Johnson were sustained only because the Supreme Court, examining those plans in light of
congressional intent, found a secondary congressional objective in Title VII that had to be accommodated--i.e., the
elimination of the effects of past discrimination in the workplace. Here, there is no congressional recognition of
diversity as a Title VII objective requiring accommodation.
Accordingly, it is beyond cavil that the Board, by invoking its affirmative action policy to lay off Sharon
Taxman, violated the terms of Title VII. While the Court in Weber and Johnson permitted some deviation from
the antidiscrimination mandate of the statute in order to erase the effects of past discrimination, these rulings do
not open the door to additional non- remedial deviations. Here, as in Weber and Johnson, the Board must justify
its deviation from the statutory mandate based on positive legislative history, not on its idea of what is appropriate.
B.
The Board recognizes that there is no positive legislative history supporting its goal of promoting racial
diversity "for education's sake", and concedes that there is no caselaw approving such a purpose to support an
affirmative action plan under Title VII. "[T]he Board would have [us] infer the propriety of this purpose from
fragments of other authority."
The Board first attempts to meet its obligations with respect to Title VII by arguing that Congress meant to
cover the situation presented here "when it amended Title VII in 1972 to cover academic institutions public and
private." A review of a Senate Committee's explanation for recommending the amendment, however, reveals that
Congress neither addressed nor embraced the racial diversity purpose before us. Instead, Congress pursued, in Title
VII's 1972 amendment with regard to the nation's schools, the same purposes it had pursued in 1964 when enacting
the original statute with respect to other employers, namely, the elimination of discriminatory employment
practices and the abolition of discrimination's invidious effects.
We find the Board's reliance on Fourteenth Amendment case law misplaced as well. We are acutely aware, as
is the Board, that the federal courts have never decided a "pure" Title VII case where racial diversity for education's
sake was advanced as the sole justification for a race-based decision. The Board argues that in deciding just such
a case, we should look to the Supreme Court's endorsement of diversity as a goal in the Equal Protection context.
This argument, however, is based upon a faulty premise.
In relving on Equal Protection cases to support its diversity goal, we understand the Board to reason as follows:
The Supreme Court observed in Johnson that "the statutory prohibition [in Title VII] with which an employer must
contend was not intended to extend as far as that of the Constitution" Accordingly, a purpose which survives
constitutional strict scrutiny necessarily passes muster under Title VII's permissible purpose test--since the Court
has endorsed the concept of diversity in Equal Protection cases, it would approve the Board's diversity purpose in
this Title VII case, where the limitations on purpose are less stringent.
We are convinced, however, that Johnson 's footnote six, in which the Court contrasted the reach of Title VII
with that of the Constitution, does not speak to the purposes that may support affirmative action under the former
but not the latter. We read the Court's observation to relate, instead, to the factual predicate that employers must
offer to prove the need for remedial efforts in Title VII as contrasted with Equal Protection affirmative action cases.
In Johnson, the Court held that the legality of the Santa Clara County Transportation Agency's plan under Title
VII must be guided by the Court's determination in Weber that affirmative action is lawful if an employer can point
to a " 'manifest imbalance ... in traditionally segregated job categories.' " In Wygant v. Jackson Board of
Education, by contrast, the Court determined that under the Constitution a public employer's remedial affirmative
action initiatives are valid only if crafted to remedy its own past or present discrimination; that is, societal
discrimination is an insufficient basis for "imposing discretionary legal remedies against innocent people." In the
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plurality's words, affirmative action must be supported by "a factual determination that the employer had a strong
basis in evidence for its conclusion that remedial action was necessary."
When the Court in Johnson observed that Title VII's statutory prohibition does not extend as far as the
Constitution, it was addressing one of Justice Scalia's arguments in dissent that since obligations under Title VII
and the Constitution are identical, a public employer's adoption of an affirmative action plan in a Title VII case
should be governed by the prior discrimination standard set forth in Wygant.
While the Supreme Court may indeed at some future date hold that an affirmative action purpose that satisfies
the Constitution must necessarily satisfy Title VII, it has yet to do so.
Were we to accept that equal protection standards may be imported into Title VII analysis, we are still
unpersuaded that the Equal Protection case law validates the Board's asserted goal of racial diversity. We cannot
agree with the Board that the racial diversity purpose is supported by both the Supreme Court's holding and the
dissenting opinions in Wygant. The Court in Wygant, although divided, agreed that under the Equal Protection
Clause, racial classifications in the context of affirmative action must be justified by a compelling state purpose and
the means chosen to effectuate that purpose must be narrowly tailored; that societal discrimination alone will not
justify a racial classification; that evidence of prior discrimination by an employer must be presented before
remedial racial classifications can be employed; and that the "role model" theory proposed by the employer as a
basis for race- conscious state action was unacceptable because it would have allowed discriminatory hiring and
layoff well beyond the point necessary for any remedial purpose and did not bear any relationship to the harm
caused by prior discrimination. The dissenting Justices believed that the Constitution would allow a public
employer to preserve the integration it had achieved through a legitimate affirmative action hiring plan by
thereafter apportioning layoffs between minority and nonnunority groups.
We are also unpersuaded by the Board's contention that Equal Protection cases arising in an education context
support upholding the Board's purpose in a Title VH action. These Equal Protection cases, unlike the case at hand,
involved corrective efforts to confront racial segregation or chronic minority underrepresentation in the schools.
In this context, we are not at all surprised that the goal of diversity was raised. While we wholeheartedly endorse
any statements in these cases extolling the educational value of exposing students to persons of diverse races and
backgrounds, given the framework in which they were made, we cannot accept them as authority for the conclusion
that the Board's non-remedial racial diversity goal is a permissible basis for affirmative action under Title VII.
More specifically, two Supreme Court cases upon which the Board relies, Bakke and Metro Broadcasting Inc.
v. FCC, are inapposite. Bakke involved a rejected White applicant's challenge under the Constitution and Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, to a special admissions program instituted by the Medical School of the University
of California at Davis which essentially set aside 16 places for minority candidates. Justice Powell, whose vote was
necessary both to establish the validity of considering race in admission decisions and to invalidate the racial quota
before the Court, was of the opinion that the attainment of a "diverse student body" is a constitutionally permissible
goal for an institution of higher education. Justice Powell pointed out that the academic freedom that has been
viewed as a "special concern" of the First Amendment includes "the freedom of a university to make its own
judgments as to the selection of its student body" and that "[t]he atmosphere of 'speculation, experiment and
creation'--so essential to the quality of higher education--is widely believed to be promoted by a diverse student
body." He then agreed with Davis' assertion that its interest in diversity implicated First Amendment concerns:
Davis' reservation of a specified number of seats in each class for individuals from preferred ethnic groups to
further its diversity purpose, however, was unacceptable because, according to Justice Powell, it misconceived the
nature of the state interest that would justify consideration of race or ethnic background.
Bakke 's factual and legal setting, as well as the diversity that universities aspire to in their student bodies, are,
in our view, so different from the facts, relevant law and the racial diversity purpose involved in this case that we
find little in Bakke to guide us.
Likewise, statements regarding the value of programming diversity made by the Court in Metro Broadcasting
when it upheld two minority preference policies adopted by the Federal Communications Commission have no
application here. The diversity interest the Court found sufficient under the Constitution to support a racial
classification had nothing whatsoever to do with the concerns that underlie Title VII. Citing Bakke, the Court
concluded that "[jiust as a 'diverse student body' contributing to a 'robust exchange of ideas' is a 'constitutionally
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permissible goal' on which a race-conscious university admissions program may be predicated, the diversity of
views and information on the airwaves serves important First Amendment values."
Finally, we turn to the Board's argument that the diversity goal underlying its application of the affirmative
action policy w-as endorsed in Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Wygant and in Justice Stevens' concurring
opinion in Johnson. We find that these statements are slender reeds indeed and any bearing that they may have
in the situation presented here is minimal. While Justice O'Connor did refer favorably to Bakke and the notion of
racial diversity in institutions of higher learning, just one year later in Johnson, a Title VII case, she rejected Justice
Steven's expansive view of the purposes that may underlie affirmative action, stating: "[Clontrary to the
intimations in JUSTICE STEVENS' concurrence, this Court did not approve preferences for minorities 'for any
reason that might seem sensible from a business or social point of view.' "As for Justice Stevens' concurrence in
Johnson, while he clearly pondered the idea of "forward-looking" affirmative action where employers do not focus
on " 'purg[ing] their own past sins of discrimination' ", his comments are not controlling.
V.
Since we have not found anything in the Board's arguments to convince us that this case requires examination
beyond statutory interpretation, we return to the point at which we started: the language of Title VII itself and the
two cases reviewing affirmative action plans in light of that statute. Our analysis of the statute and the case law
convinces us that a non-remedial affirmative action plan cannot form the basis for deviating from the
antidiscrimination mandate of Title VII.
The Board admits that it did not act to remedy the effects of past employment discrimination. The parties have
stipulated that neither the Board's adoption of its affirmative action policy nor its subsequent decision to apply it
in choosing between Taxman and Williams was intended to remedy the results of any prior discrimination or
identified underrepresentation of Blacks within the Piscataway School District's teacher workforce as a whole. Nor
does the Board contend that its action here was directed at remedying any de jure or de facto segregation. Even
though the Board's race-conscious action was taken to avoid what could have been an all-White faculty within the
Business Department, the Board concedes that Blacks are not under represented in its teaching workforce as a
whole or even in the Piscataway High School.
Rather, the Board's sole purpose in applying its affirmative action policy in this case was to obtain an
educational benefit which it believed would result from a racially diverse faculty. While the benefits flowing from
diversity in the educational context are significant indeed, we are constrained to hold, as did the district court, that
inasmuch as "the Board does not even attempt to show that its affirmative action plan was adopted to remedy past
discrimination or as the result of a manifest imbalance in the employment of minorities," the Board has failed to
satisfy the first prong of the Weber test.
We turn next to the second prong of the Weber analysis. This second prong requires that we determine whether
the Board's policy "unnecessarily trammel [s] ... [nonminority] interests. ..." Under this requirement, too, the
Board's policy is deficient.
We begin by noting the policy's utter lack of definition and structure. While it is not for us to decide how much
diversity in a high school facility is "enough," the Board cannot abdicate its responsibility to define "racial
diversity" and to determine what degree of racial diversity in the Piscataway School is sufficient.
The affirmative action plans that have met with the Supreme Court's approval under Title VII had objectives,
as well as benchmarks which served to evaluate progress, guide the employment decisions at issue and assure the
grant of only those minority preferences necessary to further the plans' purpose. By contrast, the Board's policy,
devoid of goals and standards, is governed entirely by the Board's whim, leaving the Board free, if it so chooses,
to grant racial preferences that do not promote even the policy's claimed purpose. Indeed, under the terms of this
policy, the Board, in pursuit of a "racially diverse" work force, could use affirmative action to discriminate against
those whom Title VII was enacted to protect. Such a policy unnecessarily trammels the interests of nonminority
employees.
Moreover, both Weber and Johnson unequivocally provide that valid affirmative action plans are "temporary"
measures that seek to " 'attain' ", not "maintain" a "permanent racial ... balance." The Board's policy, adopted in
1975, is an established fixture of unlimited duration, to be resurrected from time to time whenever the Board
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believes that the ratio between Blacks and Whites in any Piscataway School is skewed. On this basis alone, the
policy contravenes Weber 's teaching.
Finally, we are convinced that the harm imposed upon a nonnunority employee by the loss of his or her job is
so substantial and the cost so severe that the Board's goal of racial diversity, even if legitimate under Title VII, may
not be pursued in this particular fashion. This is especially true where, as here, the nonmainority employee is
tenured. In Weber and Johnson, when considering whether nonminorities were unduly encumbered by affirmative
action, the Court found it significant that they retained their employment. We, therefore, adopt the plurality's
pronouncement in Wygant that "[wihile hiring goals impose a diffuse burden, often foreclosing only one of several
opportunities, layoffs impose the entire burden of achieving racial equality on particular individuals, often resulting
in serious disruption of their lives. That burden is too intrusive."
Accordingly, we conclude that under the second prong of the Weber test, the Board's affirmative action policy
violates Title VII. In addition to containing an impermissible purpose, the policy "unnecessarily trammel[s] the
interests of the [nonniinority] employees."
VI.
The district court did not analyze Taxman's claims based on the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination and
we need not do so in detail here. The parties have agreed that the legal analysis required by the state statute is
essentially the same as that undertaken in Title VII cases. While the New Jersey Supreme Court has yet to consider
a voluntarily adopted affirmative action plan in light of the NJLAD, it is undisputed that the NJLAD has been
interpreted to parallel Title VII. In Peper v. Princeton Univ. Bd. of Trustees, the Supreme Court of New Jersey
wrote that "where [Title VII] standards are useful and fair, it is in the best interests of everyone concerned to have
some uniformity in the law."
Given that statement, we predict that the New Jersey Supreme Court would follow the analytical directive of
Weber and Johnson. Analysis of this case under the NJLAD would, therefore, lead to the same result as that which
we have reached under Title VII. Sharon Taxman is entitled to summary judgment on her claim made under the
NJLAD.
VII.
Having found the Board liable under Title VII, we turn our attention to the issue of damages, addressing first
the district court's order that Taxman be awarded one hundred percent backpay for the entire period of her layoff.
The Board argues that where a backpay award is appropriate, the court's goal should be to restore " 'the conditions
and relationships that would have been had there been no' " unlawful discrimination. According to the Board, the
district court's award of one hundred percent backpay was plainly unfair. Had it not invoked the affirmative action
plan, the Board would have followed its usual procedure, using a coin toss or other random process to break the
seniority tie between Williams and Taxman. Taxman, therefore, would have stood no more than a fifty percent
chance of keeping her job had there been no unlawful discrimination.
We disagree. In deciding backpay issues, a district court has wide latitude to "locate 'a just result' " and to
further the "make whole remedy of Title VII in light of the circumstances of a particular case." While Taxman
cannot be returned to the position that she held prior to her layoff--one of virtually precise equality with Williams
in terms of the factors relevant to the decision-she can be returned to a position of financial equality with Williams
through a one hundred percent backpay award. We are convinced that this award most closely approximates the
conditions that would have prevailed in the absence of discrimination.
We find an additional basis for our holding in the analysis set forth in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins. In that
case, the Supreme Court held that where an employee proves that discrimination played a role in an employment
decision, the employer will not be found "liable if it can prove that, even if it had not taken [race] into account it
would have come to the same decision regarding a particular person." Here, Taxman has clearly established that
the Board is liable and that she was not paid during the relevant period. Under the logic of Hopkins, the Board
cannot avoid a one hundred percent backpay award unless it can establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
Taxman would have received some lesser amount had the Board not taken race into account. This, of course, the
Board cannot do.
Given the law and the circumstances presented in this case, we are convinced that the district court's analysis
with respect to backpay reflects the sound exercise of judicial discretion and we will affirm the award.
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The Board further contends that the district court erred in calculating prejudgment interest using the IRS
adjusted prime rate. According to the Board, the district court should have applied the post-judgment rate set forth
in 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a). This argument is meritless.
The matter of prejudgment interest is left to the discretion of the district court. Although a court "may" use the
post-judgment standards of 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a), it is not compelled to do so. The adjusted prime rate, established
periodically by the Secretary of the Treasury and codified in 26 U.S.C. § 6621, has been used regularly by district
courts to calculate prejudgment interest.
We thus hold that the district court's calculation of pre-judgment interest was consistent with the sound exercise
of judicial discretion.
Finally, in her cross-appeal, Taxman asks that we find that the district court erred in dismissing her claim for
punitive damages under the NJLAD.
At a January 5, 1994 proceeding devoted to the issue of damages, the district court reaffirmed a decision made
at a pretrial conference to "strike the punitive damages claim" on the ground that "there is no evidence to support
[it]." The court made the following comment with respect to punitive damages:
The New Jersey Supreme Court has established a high threshold requirement which must be met before an
award of punitive damages can be sustained. Punitive damages are to be awarded only " 'when the wrongdoer's
conduct is especially egregious.'" "To warrant a punitive award, the defendant's conduct must have been wantonly
reckless or malicious. There must be an intentional wrongdoing in the sense of an 'evil minded' act accompanied
by a wanton and willful disregard to the rights of another.... The key to the right to punitive damages is the
wrongfulness of the intentional action." "[The New Jersey] case indicates that the requirement [of willfulness or
wantonness] may be satisfied upon a showing that there has been a deliberate act or omission with knowledge of
a high degree of probability of harm and reckless indifference or consequences." "[The New Jersey courts have]
stated that proof of actual malice [is] 'a condition precedent to a punitive damages award.' "
Having examined the record evidence in this case against the background of the New Jersey punitive damages
standard, we agree with the district court that the evidence would not support a finding that the Board acted
willfully, wantonly or outrageously in dismissing Taxman. We conclude, therefore, that Taxnan's claim for
punitive damages was properly dismissed.
VIII.
While we have rejected the argument that the Board's non-remedial application of the affirmative action policy
is consistent with the language and intent of Title VII, we do not reject in principle the diversity goal articulated
by the Board. Indeed, we recognize that the differences among us underlie the richness and strength of our Nation.
Our disposition of this matter, however, rests squarely on the foundation of Title VII. Although we applaud the goal
of racial diversity, we cannot agree that Title VII permits an employer to advance that goal through non-remedial
discriminatory measures.
Having found that the district court properly concluded that the affirmative action plan applied by the Board
to lay off Taxman is invalid under Title VII, and that the district court did not err in calculating Taxman's damages
or in dismissing her claim for punitive damages, we will affirm the judgment of the district court.
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge, concurring:[OMITTED]
SLOVITER, Chief Judge, dissenting, with whom Judges LEWIS and McKEE join.
In the law, as in other professions, it is often how the question is framed that determines the answer that is
received. Although the divisive issue of affirmative action continues on this country's political agenda, I do not
see this appeal as raising a broad legal referendum on affirmative action policies. Indeed, it is questionable whether
this case is about affirmative action at all, as that term has come to be generally understood-i.e. preference based
on race or gender of one deemed "less qualified" over one deemed "more qualified." Nor does this case even require
us to examine the parameters of the affirmative action policy originally adopted in 1975 by the Board of Education
of the Township of Piscataway in response to a state regulation requiring affirmative action programs or the
Board's concise 1983 one-page affirmative action policy.
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Instead, the narrow question posed by this appeal can be restated as whether Title VII requires a New Jersey
school or school board, which is faced with deciding which of two equally qualified teachers should be laid off, to
make its decision through a coin toss or lottery, a solution that could be expected of the state's gaming tables, or
whether Title VII permits the school board to factor into the decision its bona fide belief, based on its experience
with secondary schools, that students derive educational benefit by having a Black faculty member in an otherwise
all-White department. Because I believe that the area of discretion left to employers in educational institutions by
Title VII encompasses the School Board's action in this case, I respectfully dissent.
The posture in which the legal issue in this case is presented is so stripped of extraneous factors that it could
well serve as the question for a law school moot court. I emphasize at the outset issues that this case does not
present. We need not decide whether it is permissible for a school to lay off a more qualified employee in favor of
a less qualified employee on the basis of race, because that did not happen here. Nor need we consider what
requirements Title VII may impose on unwilling employers, or how much racial diversity in a high school faculty
may be "enough."
Significantly, although the School Board is a public employer, this case does not place before us for decision
the limits on race-conscious action imposed on public entities by the Constitution because we are presented with
no constitutional claim. Therefore, we must measure the Board's actions under the restraints imposed by Title VII
rather than the more demanding ones imposed on government action by the Equal Protection Clause. In this
respect the case is similar to that presented in Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, where the
Supreme Court noted that even though the defendant was a public employer it would decide the case only under
Title VII because no constitutional issue was raised or addressed below. The Court also made clear that for
purposes of Title VII, the same standard applies to public and private employers, stating that "[t]he fact that a
public employer must also satisfy the Constitution does not negate the fact that the statutory prohibition with which
that employer must contend was not intended to extend as far as that of the Constitution." This was an express
rejection of Justice Scalia's contention "that the obligations of a public employer under Title VII must be identical
to its obligations under the Constitution." Thus it is important to keep in mind that we must measure the Board's
action in this case against the same standard we would apply to a private school.
I.
When in May 1989 the School Board was faced with the disagreeable necessity of reducing by one the teaching
staff in the Business Department of Piscataway High School, it recognized that reference to the applicable New
Jersey law, which provides the road map in terms of seniority, would not suffice here because the two teachers had
equal seniority. The Board, which has the responsibility of gauging the educational requirements of the students
under its charge, would have to resort to its own experience as there were no other prescribed guidelines. It did
not then turn to the affirmative action policy to make the decision based on race. There was no built-in quota,
expressed or implied, for minority faculty, and Taxman does not so suggest. On the contrary, the Board next
considered a variety of undoubtedly relevant factors, any one of which might have tipped the scales in favor of
laying off one teacher or the other. Had Taxman been deemed a better teacher than Williams, that alone could have
pointed the arrow in her direction. Or, had Williams participated in volunteer activity while Taxman spent her
spare time in other activities, that alone could have accounted for Williams' retention. The deposition testimony
of several board members who participated in the decision indicates that before the affirmative action policy was
considered, a number of other criteria were discussed to break the tie, including work performance, certifications,
evaluations, teaching ability, and volunteerism. The two teachers with the least seniority, Taxman and Williams,
were determined to be equal with respect to each of these other criteria.
In its opinion, the majority declares the School Board's affirmative action policy unlawful. An examination of
the so-called affirmative action policy reveals that it does nothing more than place before the School Board the need
to consider minority personnel among other equally qualified candidates for employment decisions. That this was
a necessary reminder in 1975 when the policy was formed can hardly be gainsaid. I believe that it also was a useful
reminder in 1989, when this School Board was faced with this decision, and perhaps even today.
A review of the record makes clear that the Board did not view itself as bound to select Williams for retention
by the 1975 affirmative action policy, which speaks only of recommendations, but after discussion and
consideration the Board made a discretionary decision to select Williams for retention to further the educational
goal of a diverse faculty.
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The Board members described their purpose in using the goal of diversity underlying the previously adopted
affirmative action policy as a factor in the layoff decision as reflecting the "general feeling ... that it was valuable
for the students to see in the various employment roles a wide range of background [s]," and "the desire to have a
diverse teaching staff in the school district." It was also intended to send "a very clear message that we feel that
our staff should be culturally diverse [for the benefit of the students]" and to "encourage awareness and acceptance
and tolerance [of people of all backgrounds]." Thus, the Board took into consideration that if Williams were laid
off, the Business Department faculty at the school would be all White.
II.
It was the Board's decision to include the desire for a racially diverse faculty among the various factors entering
into its discretionary decision that the majority of this court brands a Title VII violation as a matter of law. No
Supreme Court case compels that anomalous result. Notwithstanding the majority's literal construction of the
language of Title VII, no Supreme Court case has ever interpreted the statute to preclude consideration of race or
sex for the purpose of insuring diversity in the classroom as one of many factors in an employment decision, the
situation presented here. Moreover, in the only two instances in which the Supreme Court examined under Title
VII, without the added scrutiny imposed by the Equal Protection Clause, affirmative action plans voluntarily
adopted by employers that gave preference to race or sex as a determinative factor, the Court upheld both plans.
In its 1979 decision in United Steelworkers v. Weber, the Court held that an agreement between a private
company and a union that sought to remedy the historical exclusion of Blacks from skilled craft unions by reserving
half the openings in an in-house training program for Blacks did not violate Title VII. A scarce decade later, it
reached a similar decision in Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, where the plan that the Court
upheld authorized consideration of the gender of a qualified applicant as one of various factors for promoting
employees into jobs in which women had been significantly under represented.
The majority presents Weber and Johnson as if their significance lies in the obstacle course they purportedly
establish for any employer adopting an affirmative action program. But, as the Justices of the Supreme Court
recognized, the significance of each of those cases is that the Supreme Court sustained the affirmative action plans
presented, and in doing so deviated from the literal interpretation of Title VII precluding use of race or gender in
any employment action. As Justice Brennan explained in Weber, "It is a 'familiar rule that a thing may be within
the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit nor within the intention of its
makers.' "
While the majority in this case views the Supreme Court's articulation of the factors that rationalized its
upholding of the affirmative action plans in those cases as establishing boundaries, no language in either Weber
or Johnson so states and, in fact, there is language to the contrary. The majority draws the line at the factors used
in those cases. In both Weber and Johnson, the Court inquired whether consideration of race in the employment
decision was justified by a permissible purpose, and then examined the effect on nonninorities to ascertain whether
the action taken "unnecessarily trammel [ed] the interests of the white employees."
However, it does not follow as a matter of logic that because the two affirmative action plans in Weber and
Johnson which sought to remedy imbalances caused by past discrimination withstood Title VII scrutiny, every
affirmative action plan that pursues some purpose other than correcting a manifest imbalance or remedying past
discrimination will run afoul of Title VII. Indeed, the Court in Weber explicitly cautioned that its holding in that
case should not be read to define the outer boundaries of the area of discretion left to employers by Title VII for the
voluntary adoption of affirmative action measures.
The majority opinion in Johnson made no attempt to draw the line that Weber left undefined. Although Justice
O'Connor's concurring opinion argued that permissible purposes under Title VII were limited to those that served
to remedy past discrimination, her vote was the sixth in favor of the majority's holding and therefore not crucial
to the outcome of the case. It follows that her narrow reading should not be read as constituting the view of the
Court.
The majority here has taken the language of Weber where the Court observed that the plan's purposes
"mirrored" those of the statute, and has elevated it to a litmus test under which an affirmative action plan can only
pass muster under Title VII if particular language in the text or legislative history of the statute can be identified
that matches the articulated purpose of the plan. Nothing in Weber suggests that the Court intended by its
"mirroring" language to create such a rigid test.
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In Weber, when the Court found that the purposes of the plan were consistent with those of Title VII, it did so
by reference not only to the language of the legislative history, but to the historical context from which the Act
arose as well. In Johnson, the Court made no attempt at all to identify language in the legislative history paralleling
the particular objectives of the plan it sustained. Thus, even in those cases the Court did not demonstrate the kind
of close fit between the plan and the statutory history demanded of the Board in this case.
In Weber, the Court's examination into the purposes of Title VII led it to the conclusion that the Act was
designed to promote "the integration of blacks into the mainstream of American society," and the breakdown of
"old patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy." The Kaiser affirmative action plan was consistent with these
sweeping, broadly stated purposes and hence was sustained.
Of course, I do not disagree with the majority that "Title VII was written to eradicate not only discrimination
per se but the consequences of prior discrimination," but I do not believe that in doing so, Congress intended to
limit the reach of Title VII to remedying past discrimination, thereby turning a blind eye toward those social forces
that give rise to future discrimination. Title VII, which was a part of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, was
fundamentally forward-looking legislation, and that purpose should not be ignored.
The effort to remedy the consequences of past discrimination (such as the "patterns of segregation and
hierarchy" referred to in Weber, cannot be isolated from the statute's broader aim to eliminate those patterns that
were potential causes of continuing or future discrimination. The causal relationship is illustrated by the industry
at issue in Weber, where the Court noted that the ongoing imbalance in the hiring of craftworkers had its roots in
a history of discrimination that had excluded Blacks from craft unions and thus prevented them from acquiring the
necessary qualifications. In describing the overarching goal toward which the Civil Rights Act was aimed, the
House Report spoke of the need to "eliminat[e] all of the causes and consequences of racial and other types of
discrimination against minorities.'
Thus, using the approach taken in Weber and Johnson as a springboard, actions consistent with and in
furtherance of the broad statutory goal of eliminating the causes of discrimination are not per se proscribed by Title
VII. This generation of young people may not recall that in 1964 racial homogeneity in schools was viewed as
among the most fundamental and pernicious aspects of the social pattern undergirding the system of discrimination
that the Civil Rights Act sought to dismantle. In the years leading up to the Act's passage, school integration was
one of the focal points of the civil rights movement. The Senate Report accompanying the 1972 amendments to
Title VII, when it was expanded to cover state and local governments, noted the connection between racial
homogeneity in schools and attitudes that lead to discrimination.
In other contexts, the Court has repeatedly recognized racial diversity in the classroom as an important means
of combating the attitudes that can lead to future patterns of discrimination.
It is "ironic indeed" that the promotion of racial diversity in the classroom, which has formed so central a role
in this country's struggle to eliminate the causes and consequences of racial discrimination, is today held to be at
odds with the very Act that was triggered by our "Nation's concern over centuries of racial injustice." Nor does it
seem plausible that the drafters of Title VII intended it to be interpreted so as to require a local school district to
resort to a lottery to determine which of two qualified teachers to retain, rather than employ the School Board's own
educational policy undertaken to insure students an opportunity to learn from a teacher who was a member of the
very group whose treatment motivated Congress to enact Title VII in the first place. In my view, the Board's
purpose of obtaining the educational benefit to be derived from a racially diverse faculty is entirely consistent with
the purposes animating Title VII and the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
The majority criticizes the Board's use of case law construing the Equal Protection Clause in this Title VII case,
notwithstanding the Supreme Court's explicit statement in Johnson that Title VII's constraint on affirmative action
was "not intended to extend as far as that of the Constitution." Nothing in the Court's language in the Johnson
footnote suggests that we confine it to the particular factual context in which it was made, and the Court is certainly
sufficiently articulate to limit its language when so inclined. Nor is the Johnson footnote the only place where the
Court signified its understanding that Title VII imposes fewer limitations on employers' voluntary affirmative
action than does the Constitution. In Weber, the Court spoke of the "narrowness of [its] inquiry" since the plan
did not involve state action and hence did not present an alleged violation of the Equal Protection Clause, and later
stated that "Title VII ... was not intended to incorporate and particularize the commands of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments." The latter statement was not made in a discussion that had to do with the "factual predicate" for
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demonstrating the need for remedial affirmative action, as the majority would confine the similar language in
Johnson.
In any event, ultimately it is the Supreme Court rather than this one that will decide whether Title VII allows
an employer more discretion to implement race-conscious employment policies than does the Constitution in the
employer's effort to promote the underlying goals of the Act. But, in the absence of any dispositive precedent, I
believe it would be shortsighted for us to disregard the Supreme Court's statements regarding the advantages of
diversity in an educational context when examining the limited use to which diversity was used as a factor in the
Board's decision here. In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, where the Court considered a University
of California affirmative action program for student admissions, Justice Powell, who announced the judgment of
the Court, recognized that a diverse student body leads to a "robust exchange of ideas," and noted that the
"essential" elements of academic freedom include the ability not only to select the student body but to determine
"who may teach."
In Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, the Court held that preferential protection against layoffs afforded
to minority teachers by the public school board's affirmative action plan could not be sustained, because the school
board's proffered justification for the plan--that minority teachers were needed to provide role models for minority
students--was not sufficiently compelling to withstand the strict scrutiny to which it was subject under the
Fourteenth Amendment. However, Justice O'Connor, in her concurring opinion which was the decisive vote in the
Court's holding, specifically distinguished the goal of providing role models from "the very different goal of
promoting racial diversity among the faculty," explicitly leaving open the possibility that the latter goal might be
sufficiently compelling to pass constitutional muster. She also made a favorable reference to Justice Powell's
endorsement of diversity in the classroom in Bakke, stating, "although its precise contours are uncertain, a state
interest in the promotion of racial diversity has been found sufficiently 'compelling,' at least in the context of higher
education, to support the use of racial considerations in furthering that interest." Her position, plus that of the four
dissenting justices, meant there were five justices in Wygant who approved in general terms the concept that the
educational benefit derived from diversity in the classroom can constitute an acceptable justification for affirmative
action.
I therefore respectfully disagree with the majority, both in its construction of Weber and Johnson as leaving no
doors open for any action that takes race into consideration in an employment situation other than to remedy past
discrimination and the consequential racial imbalance in the workforce, and in what appears to be its limited view
of the purposes of Title VII. I would hold that a school board's bona fide decision to obtain the educational benefit
to be derived from a racially diverse faculty is a permissible basis for its voluntary affirmative action under Title
VII scrutiny.
III.
It is undeniable that, in the abstract, a layoff imposes a far greater burden on the affected employee than a denial
of promotion or even a failure to hire. In this case, however, it cannot be said with any certainty that Taxman would
have avoided the layoff had the Board's decision not been race-conscious. If a random selection had been made,
Taxman would have had no more than a fifty- percent chance of not being laid off. Thus, this was not a situation
where Taxman had a "legitimate and firmly rooted expectation" of no layoff.
This differs from the situation of an employee who is next in line for a promotion by the objective factor of
seniority. Taxman's qualifications were merely equal to those of her competitor for this purpose. In Johnson the
Court held that because there were six other employees who also met the qualifications for the job, Johnson had
no "entitlement" or "legitimate firmly rooted expectation" in the promotion, even though he had scored higher than
the others on the qualifying test. Moreover, just as the plaintiff in Johnson remained eligible for promotion in the
future, Taxman retained recall rights after her layoff, and did in fact regain her job.
The majority relies in part on Wygant, where the Supreme Court found that the use of faculty layoffs to meet
affirmative action goals in a public school system imposed too heavy a burden on White employees. However, the
Court's holding that the Wygant plan was not "narrowly tailored" for purposes of an equal protection challenge is
not dispositive of the present inquiry as to whether a plan "unnecessarily trammels" the rights of White employees
for Title VII purposes. Not only was a different legal standard applicable but Wygant is also distinguishable
because the Wygant plan caused nonniinority teachers with more seniority to be laid off in order to retain minority
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teachers 'with less seniority. Wygant. The Wygant plan actually caused teachers to be laid off who, in the absence
of the plan, would have had no risk of layoff. That burden--increasing the chance of layoff from zero to one
hundred percent-is significantly heavier than that imposed on Taxman, who would have had a substantial chance
of being laid off even absent any consideration of diversity.
Only three members of the Court subscribed to language in the plurality opinion in Wygant suggesting that
the use of layoffs to accomplish affirmative action goals will never survive strict scrutiny. The two concurring
justices did not go that far. Therefore I do not read Wygant to hold that no race-conscious layoff decision will
survive Title VII scrutiny.
The majority gives a similarly narrow reading to Weber and Johnson, construing these cases to impose a
wooden, "unequivocal" requirement that all affirmative action plans must be explicitly temporary in order to be
valid. In fact, the Johnson plan itself "contain[ed] no explicit end date," and the Court indicated that only certain
plans that are particularly burdensome on nonminorities in other respects need necessarily be expressly temporary.
"Express assurance that a program is only temporary may be necessary if the program actually sets aside positions
according to specific numbers." The Supreme Court's references to the temporary duration of the plans at issue in
Weber and Johnson are more accurately construed as an understandable effort to assure that race does not become
a permanently embedded consideration in employment decisions. The significant consideration is whether there
has been an effort "to minimize the effect of the program on other employees," not whether the underlying policy
is set to run a specified number of years.
In the situation before us, I see ample basis from which to deduce an effort to minimize the effect of the Board's
affirmative action policy on non-minority employees. One such aspect is the discretionary nature of the policy.
The Board is free not to apply the policy, even to break a tie. Also significant is the infrequency with which the
Board has resorted to the policy. Although it may be of little comfort to Taxman, the fact that this is the first time
in the twenty years since the policy was adopted that it has been applied to a layoff decision demonstrates the
minimum impact on White teachers as a whole. And since, by its own terms, it only applies in the rare instances
in which two candidates are of different races but equal qualifications and the department in question is not already
diverse, it is likely that it will continue to be infrequently applied.
In this connection, I deem it further evidence of the Board's interest in minimizing any adverse effect on
non-minorities that it has not defined diversity by any specific numerical goal. Although the majority regards that
as a major concern, I view the lack of any such figure as an indication that the Board's plan does not impose a fixed
quota with the rigidity attendant thereto.
It is not the province of this court to intrude into what is essentially an educational decision. Once we have
determined that promoting faculty diversity for educational purposes can be a valid justification for an appropriately
limited race-conscious action, it is not our role to second-guess the judgment of educators as to the level of diversity
that produces the educational environment they deem appropriate. The Board's action is an attempt to create an
educational environment that will maximize the ability of students to address racial stereotypes and misconceptions
born of lack of familiarity. I find it difficult to believe that an Act that was given birth by the tensions of the civil
rights era precludes it from doing so under the facts before us here. Given the record before us, the consequence
of the narrow reading that the majority gives Weber and Johnson is the very irony that the Supreme Court said
would result from interpreting this civil rights statute in a manner divorced from its historic context.
I return to the question raised at the outset: whether Title VII requires that the Board toss a coin to make the
layoff selection between equally situated employees. In his opinion for the majority in Weber, Justice Brennan
noted the distinction made by Congress between requiring and permitting affirmative action by employers. He
deemed it important that, while Congress explicitly provided that Title VII should not be interpreted to require any
employer to grant preferential treatment to a group because of its race, Congress never stated that Title VII should
not be interpreted to permit certain voluntary efforts.
In this case, the majority gives too little consideration to the tie-breaking method that its holding will impose
on the Board. It points to no language in Title VII to suggest that a lottery is required as the solution to a layoff
decision in preference to a reasoned decision by members of the School Board, some of whom are experienced
educators, that the race of a faculty member has a relevant educational significance if the department would
otherwise be all White. While it may seem fairer to some, I see nothing in Title VII that requires use of a lottery.
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Because I cannot say that faculty diversity is not a permissible purpose to support the race-conscious decision
made here and because the Board's action was not overly intrusive on Taxman's rights, I would reverse the grant
of summary judgment for Taxman under Title VII and direct that summary judgment be granted to the School
Board.
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge, dissenting: [OMITTED]
LEWIS, Circuit Judge, dissenting: [OMITTED]
McKEE, Circuit Judge, dissenting: [OMITTED]
AMENDED JUDGMENT
Aug. 21, 1996.
This cause came on to be heard on the record from the United States District Court for the District of New
Jersey and was argued by counsel November 29, 1995 and reargued before the Court in banc May 14, 1996.
On consideration whereof, it is now here ordered and adjudged by this Court that the judgment of the said
District Court entered February 15, 1994, be, and the same is hereby affirmed. Costs taxed against the appellant
in each appeal. All of the above in accordance with the opinion of this Court.
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RECENT CASE
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964--TITLE VH--AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
THIRD CIRCUIT HOLDS THAT DIVERSITY IS NOT, IN ITSELF, A SUFFICIENT
JUSTIFICATION FOR GRANTING PREFERENCES TO MINORITIES
TAXMAN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION, 91 F.3D 1547 (3d Cir. 1996).
Harvard Law Review, December, 1996; 110 Harv. L. Rev. 535
Affirmative action has been the subject of heated debate for several decades. Although proponents view
affirmative action as "useful in overcoming entrenched racial hierarchy," critics condemn racial preferences as
reverse discrimination. In the employment discrimination context, a recurring question is under what
circumstances may an employer give preferences to minorities. Last August, in Taxman v. Board of Education,
the Third Circuit found the desire to promote diversity to be an insufficient justification for such preferences under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"). The Taxman court maintained that the Supreme Court,
in the landmark cases of Johnson v. Transportation Agency and United Steelworkers v. Weber, had clearly
required that affirmative action be used only to remedy past discrimination or to correct the underrepresentation
of minorities in the employer's workforce. Because Piscataway High School ("Piscataway") had never discriminated
in the past and blacks were not under represented at Piscataway, the Taxman court correctly held that the
employer's actions violated Title VII. The majority adopted the sensible and cautious approach of not further
departing from the plain language of Title VII, which clearly protects all races from race-based discrimination,
absent a clear mandate from either the Supreme Court or Congress.
In May 1989, the Board of Education of Piscataway ("Board") decided to lay off a teacher in the Business
Department of the high school. State law required that schools lay off teachers on the basis of seniority, and gave
the Board discretion only in the case of a tie in seniority. Debra Williams, a black woman who was the only
minority teacher in the department, and Sharon Taxman, a white woman, were tied for last in seniority. On the
basis of its "commitment to affirmative action," and reasoning that a diversity of backgrounds among teachers
benefitted students, the Board terminated Taxman.
After Taxman filed an employment discrimination claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC"), the United States filed a Title VII claim in the United States District Court for the District of New
Jersey, and Taxman intervened as a plaintiff. All of the parties agreed that the Board had never discriminated
against black employees and that blacks were neither under represented nor underutilized on the teaching staff as
a whole. On the basis of these facts, the district court entered summary judgment against the Board.
In a divided en banc decision, the Third Circuit affirmed. Basing its decision on the Johnson and Weber cases,
the court found diversity to be an inadequate basis for affirmative action. According to the Taxman majority, the
Supreme Court held in Weber that the employer's affirmative action plan did not violate Title VII, because the
plan's "purpose 'mirror[ed] those of the statute' and . did not 'unnecessarily trammel the interests of the
[non-minority] employees."' The Court broadened the range of permissible affirmative action plans in Johnson,
a case involving gender discrimination, to include those plans intended to remedy a "manifest imbalance" in
"traditionally segregated job categories." In reviewing the analytical framework of these cases, the Taxman court
reasoned that Title VII permits the consideration of race in employment decisions only if there is either evidence
of past discrimination or a manifest imbalance.
The court held that the Board's plan failed the first prong of the Weber test because the Board's objective of
promoting diversity was not remedial and did not mirror one of Congress's other goals in enacting Title VII. The
Board argued that the Supreme Court had endorsed the goal of promoting diversity in the educational context in
cases involving the Equal Protection Clause. The court, however, distinguished the equal protection cases on the
basis that the principal purpose of each affirmative action plan in the equal protection cases was either to combat
segregation or to remedy underrepresentation in schools, goals explicitly permitted by Weber and Johnson.
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Chief Judge Sloviter filed a dissenting opinion, arguing that the Supreme Court has never interpreted Title VII
to forbid considering diversity in making employment decisions. In particular, Chief Judge Sloviter maintained
that the Weber and Johnson Courts had not intended to exclude all non-remedial purposes. He reasoned that
because Title VII was intended, in part, "to eliminate those patterns that were potential causes of continuing or
future discrimination," and because "racial homogeneity in schools was viewed as among the most fundamental
and pernicious aspects of the social pattern undergirding the system of discrimination," the achievement of
diversity, in the educational context in particular, is consistent with the purposes underlying Title VII. Chief Judge
Sloviter found further support for his position in various statements by Justices who have viewed diversity as a
legitimate objective in similar contexts.
The Taxman court wisely refused to depart from Title VII's text any more than the Supreme Court has explicitly
directed. On its face, Title VII bans racial preferences in all cases, because it prohibits discrimination "against any
individual ... on the basis of such individual's race .... " The Supreme Court, however, has not adopted such a
literal interpretation; instead, it has permitted racial preferences in certain instances. Johnson allows an employer
to use affirmative action if there is a manifest imbalance in the employer's workforce, ostensibly without regard to
the employer's actual justification. Thus, given a manifest imbalance, an employer can use racial preferences even
if its objective is to promote diversity. The diversity argument in the present case fails, however, because a manifest
imbalance is lacking.
The dissenters correctly pointed out that the Supreme Court has yet to clearly demarcate the outer boundaries
of permissible affirmative action. Neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has explicitly addressed whether
diversity in the educational context is alone a sufficient justification for affirmative action under Title VII.
Although the Taxman majority viewed the issue as unequivocally resolved by Johnson and Weber, the language
used in those decisions is ambiguous; various statements made by Justices in supporting the goal of diversity in the
educational context exacerbate this ambiguity.
Under Johnson, an employer can favor minorities as long as there is a manifest imbalance in a traditionally
segregated job category. Given such a manifest imbalance, an employer can legally implement an affirmative
action program without regard to its justification; thus, the employer can grant preferences to minorities to promote
diversity-or to achieve any other reasonable goal. Therefore, Johnson supports the dissenters' argument that Title
VII does not ban affirmative action plans intended to promote diversity to a limited extent. There was not,
however, a manifest imbalance at Piscataway. The Taxman majority decided the case correctly to the extent that
the diversity objective is subsumed by the manifest imbalance standard.
The dissenters, however, asserted that Title VII permits the use of affirmative action to achieve diversity
independent of the manifest imbalance standard. They argued that the objective of having a minority teacher in
the Business Department constituted a sufficient interest to justify affirmative action under Title VII.
The fact that all of the employment discrimination cases in which the Supreme Court has discussed diversity
in a favorable light have also involved a manifest imbalance, however, supports the opposite conclusion: that
diversity is not a legitimate purpose under Title VII in the absence of a manifest imbalance. The cases cited by the
Board all discussed the benefits of diversifying an "all-white, or nearly all-white, faculty." Diversity is more likely
to have substantial benefits in that situation than in cases in which blacks are over represented in some departments
and under represented in others, such as the situation at Piscataway. Those Justices who supported the objective
of diversity in the context of an all-white teaching staff would likely not have supported the goal of ensuring that
the proportion of minorities in every school department equaled that of the local population.
Given the lack of dispositive precedent, the Taxman majority wisely declined to extend the reasoning of Weber
and Johnson to allow employers to discriminate for the purpose of achieving diversity, an aim that is amorphous
at best. In Weber and Johnson, the Supreme Court carved out exceptions to the literal interpretation of the statute;
the Taxman majority adopted the sensible and judicious approach of not departing from the plain language of the
statute any further. Without a clear lead from the Supreme Court or Congress, the court would have been acting
beyond its authority had it further expanded the exceptions to the prohibition against race-based discrimination.
Copyright C 1996 Harvard Law Review Association
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HIGH COURT ASKS JUSTICE DEPT. FOR COMMENT ON RACIAL LAYOFF CASE
The Washington Post
Wednesday, January 22, 1997
Joan Biskupic
Acting in the high-profile case of a white teacher who
was laid off while a black colleague with equal
credentials was retained, the Supreme Court yesterday
asked the Justice Department for its views on whether
such actions violate federal law.
The case, out of Piscataway, N.J., has gained national
prominence and brought renewed attention to the issue
of whether employers can take race into account in
order to foster diversity in the work force. Although the
Supreme Court has not yet decided whether to hear the
case, asking the Justice Department to weigh in may be
a signal that the court is inclined to accept the case
later this year.
How the case is decided could affect the race-based
policies of all employers, including private companies
with voluntary affirmative action programs. A lower
court nmled against the Piscataway school board, saying
employers could not consider a worker's race in such
employment decisions, except to compensate for past
discrimination.
Yesterday's order forces the administration into the
center of the politically difficult case. During George
Bush's presidency and in the early months of Clinton's,
the Justice Department sided with the white teacher
and was a party to the bias lawsuit she filed against the
school board. But during Clinton's first term, the
department switched sides to favor the board and
arguments for racial diversity.
The Justice Department was unable to fully argue its
position the second time around and since then,
through personnel changes and responses to separate
high court decisions, the administration's overall
affirmative action stance has been moderated. The
department's submission in Board of Education of
Piscataway v. Taxman, which could reawaken internal
conflicts over race-based policies, will clarify the
administration's position.
The Justice Department was not given a deadline for
its response, and a spokesman said yesterday it could
take months.
The case began in 1989 when the Piscataway school
board needed to lay off a teacher, and chose Sharon
Taxman, who is white, over a black teacher, Debra
Williams, with the same amount of seniority and
strikingly similar credentials. Both were on the high
school business teaching staff in the small, central New
Jersey town.
When the board, paring the business department,
chose to keep Williams over Taxman, it acknowledged
that it was not trying to remedy any past discrimination
or compensate for the underrepresentation of
minorities. It said it wanted to provide business
students with a racially diverse teaching staff. School
officials have said Taxman and Williams were equally
qualified.
Joined at the time by the Justice Department, Taxman
contended that the board's policy violated Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which protects public and
private employees from race discrimination. A federal
district court ruled for Taxman and awarded her
$144,000 in back pay. Then, as the school board was
appealing the case in 1994, the Justice Department
switched sides to defend affirmative action programs
aimed at racial diversity.
The department's civil rights division, led by Deval L.
Patrick, argued that nothing in Title VII prevented the
board from considering that Williams was the only
black teacher in the business department and that there
was some value in keeping her on because of her race.
But the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit
denied the Justice Department's request to submit a
"friend of the court" brief and considered the Justice
Department's move a motion to withdraw as a party (on
the side of Taxman). The appeals court ordered the
government removed from the case.
When the 3rd Circuit ruled for Taxman last year, the
majority's broadly worded opinion said the benefits of
diversity in education are not significant enough to
justify consideration of race except "to remedy past
discrimination or as the result of a manifest imbalance
in the employment of minorities."
In appealing, the Piscataway school board called the
case a "lightning rod in a stormy national debate" over
interpretations of Title VII. "It also raises the important
question of whether education presents unique concerns
when fashioning rules limiting consideration of race in
employment generally."
The board's lawyer, David B. Rubin, said yesterday
that if the 3rd Circuit ruling stands or is adopted by the
Supreme Court, it would dramatically limit affirmative
action as it is known today.
Stephen E. Klausner, who represents Taxman,
however, maintains that she can win the case without
great disruption to affirmative action nationwide, so
long as any high court decision focuses only on layoffs,
rather than other hiring decisions.
Copyright 1997, The Washington Post Co.
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SUPREME COURT IS ASKED TO PASS ON RACE BIAS CASE
Los Angeles Times
Friday, June 6, 1997
David G. Savage
WASHINGTON -- Hoping to avoid a showdown on
the continuing legality of affirmative action in the
workplace, the Clinton administration urged the
Supreme Court on Thursday to deny review of a closely
watched New Jersey case that outlawed the use of race
as a basis for workplace decisions.
The dispute over the 1989 layoff of Sharon Taxman,
a white schoolteacher, has proved to be a political and
legal hot potato for the administration. It could also
make for a landmark decision if the Supreme Court
issues a written ruling siding with Taxman.
In recent years, a more conservative Supreme Court
generally has barred the government from using race
as a deciding factor in awarding contracts, jobs or
scholarships. But the justices have not reconsidered
earlier rulings that allowed employers broad leeway to
use affirmative action.
Now, that issue is before the court in an appealed
case (Piscataway Township Board of Education vs.
Taxman, 96-679).
The case asks whether employers may "take race
into account for purposes other than remedying past
discrimination." A U.S. appeals court in Philadelphia
said no.
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 bars employers from
discriminating based on race and gender. Given "this
clear anti-discrimination mandate," wrote Judge Carol
Mansmann for an 8-4 majority of the U.S. 3rd Circuit
Court of Appeals, "a non- remedial affirmative action
plan, even one with a laudable purpose, cannot pass
muster."
The decision upheld a $144,000-damage award
given to Taxman, who had been laid off when the
school board needed to eliminate one business teacher.
Rather than flip a coin, the board decided to lay off
Taxman and retain a black teacher, Debra Williams,
with the same seniority. Both had started work on the
same day.
Although the school district had a racially mixed
faculty, the board president said that retaining the
black business teacher "was sending a very clear
message that we feel that our staff should be culturally
diverse."
But Taxman sued, alleging that she was a victim of
illegal race bias. This somewhat unusual case now has
split two administrations, as well as the lower courts.
Bush administration lawyers took Taxman's side.
The Clinton administration, upon taking office in
1993, switched sides and backed the school board.
But the strong rejection of affirmative action by the
appeals court has raised the possible stakes and led to
a prolonged internal debate within the administration.
The justices are likely to decide within a month
whether to review the case. If they do, it would set the
stage for a ruling that could greatly limit affirmative
action in the workplace.
However, if the court denies review--as the
administration hopes--its action would set no national
precedent. It would, however, outlaw most workplace
affirmative action in Pennsylvania, New Jersey and
Delaware, the states covered by the 3rd Circuit Court.
In the Piscataway case, the appeals court ruling is
"seriously flawed," Solicitor General Walter Dellinger
told the court. It would forbid police departments or
school boards to hire minority employees to better
serve their communities, he said.
But the facts in the teacher's case are unusual and
unlike "the real world," he added. "This court should
await a case that is more representative of real- life
experience."
Copyright 1997, The Times Mirror Company
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COURT TO DECIDE MAJOR CASE ON RACIAL HIRING
The Associated Press
Friday, June 27, 1997
Richard Carelli
Rebuffing the Clinton administration, a Supreme
Court increasingly hostile to racial preferences plunged
Friday into a teacher-firing case that could lead to a
pivotal ruling on affirmative action.
Asked by the administration to stay out of the
unusual dispute, the justices instead agreed to decide
whether a New Jersey school board unlawfully laid off
a white teacher to protect an equally qualified black
teacher.
Arguments in the case will be heard after the court's
1997-98 term begins next fall, and a ruling is expected
sometime in 1998.
Lower courts ruled that the Piscataway Board of
Education's effort to preserve diversity amounted to
racial discrimination. The school board carried the
fight to the nation's highest court.
Justice Department lawyers, apparently worried the
school board was entering what could be a
precedent-setting battle without enough ammunition,
urged the court to leave the lower court rulings intact
- action that would set no national precedent.
The case became a rallying cry for Republicans in
Congress who seek to dismantle many
affirmative-action programs after the Bush
administration supported the white teacher's complaint
with a reverse-discrimination lawsuit against the
school board.
When President Clinton took office, the Justice
Department tried to switch sides and support the
school board and its action in retaining the black
teacher.
A federal appeals court treated the government's
switch as a request to withdraw from the case, and now
the white teacher and the school board are the only
combatants. The Clinton administration, however, now
may seek the court's permission to re-enter the case.
The dispute dates back to the school board's 1989
decision to abolish one teaching position in Piscataway
High School's business education department.
New Jersey law requires that tenured teachers be laid
off in reverse order of seniority, but two teachers -
Sharon Taxman and Debra Williams - had been hired
on the same day nine years earlier.
Taxman is white; Williams is black. Everyone agrees
that they were equally qualified.
The school board laid off Taxman because Williams
was the only minority teacher in the 10-teacher
business department. The school board never had
discriminated against black employees, and in 1975
had adopted an affirmative-action plan that favored
racial diversity "when candidates appear to be of equal
qualification."
Soon after her layoff, Taxman filed a racial-bias
complaint with the federal Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission. She said the board's action
violated an anti-bias law known as Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.
By the time a federal judge ruled for Taxman, she
had been rehired. She was awarded $144,000 in back
pay and damages, and the board was ordered to treat
her seniority as if she had never been laid off.
The 3rd U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the
judge's ruling by an 8-4 vote last August. The appeals
court said Title VII prohibits any race-conscious
decision-making if it is not taken to remedy past
discrimination.
In the appeal acted on Friday, the school board
relied heavily on the Supreme Court's landmark 1978
ruling that first condoned the concept of affirmative
action.
The court said then that racial diversity could be a
factor in a university's admissions decisions but that
rigid racial quotas could not be used.
Since then, the court's rulings on the legitimacy of
affirmative action by private and public employers and
government set-aside programs have been far from
consistent.
In its last full-blown decision on affirmative action,
the court in 1995 curtailed in sweeping terms the
federal government's power to give special help to
racial minorities.
Copyright 1997, The Associated Press
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AFFIRMATIVE ACTION HITS CRUCIAL TEST
TOP COURT TAKES STATE BIAS CASE
The Star-Ledger Newark, NJ
Saturday, June 28, 1997
Robert Cohen, Star-Ledger Washington Bureau
The Supreme Court, setting the stage for a showdown
on the use of affirmative action in the workplace, said
yesterday it will decide whether a New Jersey school
board illegally laid off a white school teacher in favor of
an equally qualified black colleague.
At issue in the closely watched case involving the
Piscataway Township Board of Education is whether
race can be used as a key factor in employment
decisions to foster diversity when there is no claim or
evidence of past discrimination. An appeals court ruled
last year that it couldn't be. It said the policy used in
Piscataway unnecessarily violated the rights of
nonminorities.
The Clinton administration, with the backing of civil
rights groups, urged the court not to take the New
Jersey case because of a concern it might affirm the
appeals court ruling and create a national precedent that
would broadly limit voluntary workplace efforts to
promote racial diversity.
The increasingly conservative court has generally
prevented the government from using race as a deciding
factor in awarding contracts, jobs or scholarships. But
the court in recent years has not re-examined earlier
rulings that gave employers wide leeway to use
affirmative action.
The case, likely to be argued in the fall and decided
sometime next year, comes as conservatives in Congress
are seeking to restrict the use of racial preferences and
as President Clinton has embarked on a national
campaign to promote racial reconciliation. Clinton's
agenda includes strong support for affirmative action.
The case stems from a complaint filed against the
school board by Sharon Taxman, a white teacher who
had been laid off in 1989 in favor of Debra Williams, a
black teacher. Both had the same seniority and identical
qualifications. Rather than flipping a coin to decide who
should be laid off, the school board cited the district's
affirmative action policies and fired Taxman, claiming
its decision would help achieve racial diversity among
the teaching staff in the high school's business
department.
New Jersey law requires that tenured teachers be laid
off in reverse order of seniority, but this rule did not
apply because both teachers were hired at the same
time.
Taxman lost two years of work but was later
reinstated to her full-time job, and both teachers are
employed at the local high school.
In the meantime, a U.S. District Court judge had ruled
against the school board and awarded Taxman
$144,000 in back pay and damages.
Last August, the full 3rd U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals said in an 8-4 decision that Title VII of the
1964 civil rights law prohibits employers from
considering race in employment situations unless it is
part of a remedial effort to correct a history of past
discrimination.
The appeals court said the board's decision to pick
Williams over Taxman was not designed to remedy a
history of past discrimination, and was therefore illegal.
The school board, faced with having to pay a
$144,000 judgment and seeking vindication for its
employment policy, asked the Supreme Court to hear
the case and reverse the decision.
David Rubin, the school board attorney, said it is
impossible to predict whether the court will preserve or
restrict "race-conscious decision-making in employment
and education." He noted, however, that the civil rights
community has expressed deep concern given the recent
record of the court on affirmative action.
"But I represent a client trying to overturn a judgment
we think is wrong," Rubin said. "We are not fighting
anyone's battle but our own."
Stephen Klausner, the attorney for Taxman, said the
"conservative court could be looking for a way to kill
affirmative action" by accepting the case. Whether the
court seeks to define the case broadly or narrowly,
Klausner said, he will argue it was improper for the
school board to use race in making its layoff decision.
The Piscataway case became a rallying cry for
Republicans in Congress opposed to affirmative-action
programs after the Bush administration supported the
white teacher's reverse-discrimination complaint
against the school board.
When President Clinton took office, the Justice
Department tried to switch sides and support the school
board and its action in retaining the black teacher.
In its legal brief, the administration argued the lower
court ruling against Williams was "seriously flawed"
and would effectively bar all "nonremedial affirmative
action" plans meant to encourage racial diversity.
But the administration nevertheless asked the
Supreme Court to pass up the case, saying it was not a
good one to examine the affirmative action question
because of peculiar factual issues.
The court ignored that opinion yesterday.
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A REVERSE DISCRIMINATION SUIT UPENDS TWO TEACHERS' LIVES
The New York Times
Sunday, August 3, 1997
Brett Pulley
The two women were brought together by a common
desire to teach children. But they have been driven
apart by race, politics and, paradoxically, a social
policy that was supposed to help end such divisiveness.
For Sharon Taxman, it all began eight years ago,
when the Piscataway Board of Education decided to
eliminate one job in the high school business
department. The one job was hers -- not because she
was a poor teacher, the board reassured her. The sole
reason, the board said, was that she was white.
Debra Williams, a business teacher as well, was
hired the same day as Ms. Taxman. She kept her job,
she learned, because she was black.
In early June 1989, about two weeks after the school
board made its decision, Ms. Taxman filed a complaint
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,
and what started as a mundane school board budget
and personnel matter quickly evolved into a subject of
national debate.
Was this a case of an employer going too far in
complying with laws intended to remedy past
discrimination in the workplace? Or was this just an
instance of a school board trying to make sure that its
teaching staff reflected the racial diversity of the
students?
The Bush Administration, which had been searching
for cases that could help eliminate race-based
preferences, seized on the Piscataway case in 1991 and
sued the school district for discrimination. Earlier this
summer, the Supreme Court announced that it would
take up the case in its next term, and the Court may
well use it to set new limits on the extent to which an
employer can use race as a factor in making personnel
decisions.
But regardless of the final Court ruling, the case has
irrevocably changed the lives of Ms. Taxman and Ms.
Williams. "You keep thinking, 'This might be a dream
or something,' " Ms. Williams said. "But you wake up
and it doesn't go away."
In the beginning, in the days after the board's
decision, Ms. Taxman was primarily concerned that
she had lost her job just as her oldest child, Michael,
was about to go to the University of Wisconsin.
"The timing, for her purposes, was horrible," Ms.
Taxman's lawyer, Stephen E. Klausner, said recently.
"She wanted her job. She needed her job."
Ms. Taxman got her job back in 1993, after another
teacher at the high school took an early retirement. But
she has continued to sue for back pay for the two years
when she was unemployed, even as she has reluctantly
become a symbol of what has become known as reverse
discrimination.
She has rejected legal assistance from conservative
groups, which have rallied around her case, and she
refuses to discuss her case with reporters, referring all
questions to Mr. Klausner.
Even though she kept her job, Ms. Williams has
found little comfort in it. The fact that her race was the
only factor that mattered to the school board was
unsettling.
"It hurt her self esteem," Ms. Williams's husband,
Alvin, recalled. "With all that she had put into
education, and then to be told that the only reason she
has her job is because she's black."
Ms. Williams and Ms. Taxman have taught in
adjoining classrooms and shared an office ever since
Ms. Taxman was rehired in 1993. They share a
telephone, and twice a month they sit alongside each
other at departmental meetings. But, other teachers
say, the two women rarely acknowledge each other's
presence. They spoke to each other only once during
the last school year, when Ms. Williams went into Ms.
Taxman's classroom to help break up a fight between
two students. "She thanked me," Ms. Williams
recalled. "Other than that, she does not say a word.
Not even 'Good morning.'"
Throughout the high school, some teachers have
informally broken into cliques - mostly along racial
lines -- in support of either Ms. Williams or Ms.
Taxman, some teachers say. And around town "there
are some mixed emotions," said Jerry Mahoney, the
current school board president.
"People feel strong about this," said Mr. Mahoney, a
local police officer who was not on the board in 1989.
But, he said, "There haven't been any negative things
like people trying to force their opinions on others."
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Piscataway seems like an unlikely place to find racial
turmoil. Situated in central New Jersey, about an
hour's drive southwest of New York City, this racially
diverse town of 47,000 people has long been sensitive
enough about race that it holds a multicultural Fourth
of July parade, and each school has an annual
Diversity Day.
Before the 1960's, Piscataway was a farming
community with no real identity of its own. But when
Route 287 opened, housing and industry followed, and
bit by bit suburban houses and industrial parks
overtook most of the town's 20 square miles. Like
many suburban towns in New Jersey that grew up in
the last three decades, Piscataway has no central town
or village. Of some 6,200 students in Piscataway's
schools, about 50 percent are white, 30 percent are
African-American, 10 percent are Asian and 5 percent
are Hispanic. The racial and ethnic composition of the
teaching staff in the district has long reflected the
population.
Mr. Mahoney noted that even though the overall
teaching staff was racially and ethnically diverse when
Ms. Taxman was dismissed, the business staff at the
high school was not. It was important to retain Ms.
Williams, he said, because the board wanted to make
the business department "more reflective of the student
population."
Mr. Mahoney, who is black and grew up in
Piscataway, said the town is fortunate not to have any
racial problems. "I think that comes from having a lot
of diversity," he said. "Every neighborhood in
Piscataway is integrated."
But it is because Piscataway High School had no
history of discrimination and because its overall
teaching staff was already diverse that the Piscataway
case has found its way to the Supreme Court.
The arguments before the Court will center on Title
VII of the landmark Civil Rights Act of 1964, which
was intended to end discrimination in the workplace
on the basis of race, religion, sex or national origin.
Last August, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit, which sits in Philadelphia, upheld a
Federal District Court ruling that an employer may
consider race in voluntary affirmative action only if it
is used to remedy past discrimination or to correct
distinctly low representation by minority workers in a
traditionally segregated job category. The appeals court
ruled that the Piscataway board did not meet either
criterion, and that even if it had correctly identified a
problem, terminating an employee would have been an
extreme way to deal with it.
Some legal experts question whether the Piscataway
case is the best test of affirmative action. They argue
that although the district invoked its affirmative action
policy, it was not intended to remedy any past
discrimination.
Arrested Identity
Teacher Struggles For Recognition
Through the years, Ms. Williams has been on a
crusade to prove her worth as an educator, constantly
struggling to show that her qualifications, not her race,
sustained her professionally. She keeps a file of papers,
including diplomas, certificates and citations she has
received, in her car. She even keeps handy a copy of
the commencement program from her high school
class in 1970, which shows that she graduated with
honors.
During lunch at a local diner in July, the former
Superintendent of the district, Philip Geiger, went over
to Ms. Williams's table. "How's the Supreme Court?"
he asked with a smile. "I got two A's on my courses at
Rutgers last semester," she responded. And although
she is not an official party to the case, she has fought
to keep the lawyers from ignoring her.
Mr. Klausner recalled an occasion, during oral
arguments in Philadelphia, when Ms. Williams walked
into the crowded courtroom and the marshal told her
she would have to leave because there were too many
people already inside. "She started yelling: 'This is my
case. This is my case. I belong in this courtroom,"' Mr.
Klausner said. "But this is not her case. She is nowhere
to be found in this case as a litigant."
Ms. Williams says the board used her as a scapegoat
to avoid making a tough personnel decision, and she
insists that the board was wrong to determine that the
only criterion distinguishing the teachers was race. "It
really bothers me every time I pick up the paper and
read that we had identical qualifications," Ms.
Williams said. "We're not Siamese twins."
Indeed, while the courts may have deemed them
equally qualified, the two women have distinctly
different qualifications and backgrounds.
Ms. Taxman, a native of Buffalo, received a
bachelor's degree in business education from the State
University of New York at Buffalo. When she arrived
at Piscataway in 1980, she was a 33-year-old mother of
two children, whose first marriage had ended in
divorce. She had taught high school courses for three
years in upstate New York and had a comprehensive
teaching endorsement that certified that she could
teach a range of courses, including bookkeeping and
accounting, business math and business English.
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Ms. Williams, who was 28 years old when she started
working in Piscataway, grew up in Winona, Miss. Her
mother was a teacher and her father and grandfather
funeral home operators. When the civil rights workers
came through her hometown, her father opened his
chapel to them, providing food and a place to stay.
She received her bachelor's degree in business
education from Mississippi Valley State University in
nearby Itta Bena. And it was there that she met her
husband, who was president of his class and had led
local civil rights marches himself. When the couple
moved to New Jersey in the late 1970's, they had one
son. They had another later.
Before teaching at Piscataway, Ms. Williams taught
middle school for half a school year in Plainfield.
Before that, she worked in administrative jobs at
colleges in Mississippi. She was authorized to teach
only secretarial studies and typewriting. But a year
after joining the Piscataway staff, she received her
master's in business education from Mississippi State
University. And in 1985, she received her
comprehensive certification, which allowed her to
teach all the courses Ms. Taxman was certified to
teach.
Ms. Williams was the first black teacher in the
school's business education department, which in 1980
had 15 teachers. By 1989, because of declining
enrollment, the department had just 10 teachers, and
Ms. Williams was still the department's only black
teacher. She is still the department's only black
teacher.
From the start, the relationship between the two
teachers was never more than cordial, and some
teachers at the school recall that Ms. Taxman seemed
withdrawn from many of her colleagues. But "it really
wasn't unusual," said Priscilla Tucker, a former math
teacher whose classroom was across the hall from Ms.
Taxman's. "She was no different than a lot of other
teachers who stay to themselves."
Icy Polarization
Serious Rift Comes With Long Debate
On April 24, 1989, a courier delivered letters to both
Ms. Taxman and Ms. Williams in their classrooms.
"The Board of Education will be discussing a reduction
in the number of business teachers," said the letters
from Gordon Moore, the school district's director of
personnel. "This board discussion could possibly result
in a recommendation to abolish a teaching staff
position and terminate your employment."
On May 22, Ms. Taxman was told that she was out
of a job.
The State of New Jersey requires that a reduction in
force be done on the basis of seniority, and schools are
allowed to use their own discretion only when there is
a tie. In this instance, the school board followed a
recommendation from the Superintendent and chose to
invoke the district's affirmative action policy to break
the tie.
As David B. Rubin, the lawyer representing the
school board, explained, both teachers had received
excellent evaluations and both had strong records of
participation in related professional activities. "One
may have had a master's and the other one didn't, and
one may have had certifications the other one didn't,"
Mr. Rubin said. "But in all ways that mattered" the
board deemed them to be equal.
On June 8, 1989, 16 days after the board told her she
was terminated, Ms. Taxman filed a charge of
discrimination with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission. Over the coming months,
while her complaint was under review, she looked for
work and collected unemployment benefits, Mr.
Klausner said.
When one teacher in the department went out on
maternity leave in 1991, Ms. Taxman returned to her
old job for a brief period. She was permanently rehired
in 1993.
In the meantime, the two women had already gone
before the State Commissioner of Education for a
hearing, where Ms. Taxman argued that Ms. Williams
had less seniority because she had used a large amount
of leave when she gave birth to her second son and
later suffered injuries in a car accident, all in the same
school year. In 1990, the Commissioner ruled in Ms.
Williams's favor, maintaining that they were equal in
seniority.
But that same year, the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission determined that there was
"probable cause" to believe that the district had
discriminated against Ms. Taxman. After the
commission's determination reached the civil rights
division of the Department of Justice, the case became
a political matter.
In 1991, the Federal Government filed suit against
the board. The Government was the principal plaintiff
in the suit, joined by Ms. Taxman. In September 1993,
a Federal District Court in Newark found in Ms.
Taxman's favor and awarded her $144,000 in back
pay. The school board appealed, and the White House,
which by now was under the control of the Clinton
Administration, tried to switch sides and support the
school board's appeal.
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit denied the Administration's request, but
allowed the Government to withdraw from the case. In
August 1996, the appeals court upheld the lower
court's ruling, which led to the Supreme Court appeal.
As the debate has continued, the rift between the two
teachers has widened. Ms. Tucker, who retired this
year, said she was friendly with both teachers, but
found it difficult to be around them at the same time.
"I noticed that when I'm with Debbie, Sharon doesn't
speak," Ms. Tucker said. "But when I'm not with
Debbie, she's very friendly."
On one occasion, the department supervisor tried to
clear the air by calling the two into his office to shake
hands. Even though they agreed, the gesture
apparently held no lasting meaning. Ms. Tucker said
that she noticed "a kind of polarization that occurred
as a result of the case" and that Ms. Taxman "has
become very friendly with a group of teachers, and
they shun other groups of teachers." A district official
denied that there was any added tension in the school
as a result of the case.
But, teachers at the schools say, Ms. Williams is
criticized by some of her colleagues who imply that she
should just be happy to have her job. "My close friends,
eating buddies, say things about her," Ms. Tucker
admitted. "People are aware of the case and they talk
about the nature of why Debbie was kept as a teacher
and Sharon was not. But that was not Debbie's doing.
She's not responsible for being born black, and she's
not responsible for the board's decision. She's trying to
defend herself when she shouldn't have to defend
herself."
To be sure, the case has made life more complicated
and stressful for both teachers.
Ms. Taxman, her lawyer said, "is not clinically
depressed, but she is depressed."
Ms. Williams is careful about what classes she allows
her youngest son, a 10th-grade student at Piscataway,
to take. "I select his teachers, because I know that some
might be prejudiced because of the case," she said.
It has also affected her health. She doesn't sleep well
and her blood pressure is high. "Every day, she comes
home all twisted up," Alvin Williams said of his wife.
"Why do you have to pay such a price for a job?"
Mr. Williams said he has told his wife: "You have
both been judged by the color of your skin. This
situation violates the principle that civil rights stand
on. The board did both of you wrong. You both have
been used. You should be teamed up, together."
Copyright 1997, The New York Times Company
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A CASE ON RACE PUTS JUSTICE O'CONNOR IN A FAMILIAR ROLE
The New York Times
Monday, August 4, 1997
Linda Greenhouse
As the Supreme Court's calendar turns from the
frantic final days of June to the fresh beginning of the
first Monday in October, Sandra Day O'Connor is once
again the Justice on the spot.
Throughout her 16-year tenure, Justice O'Connor has
been at the center of many of the Court's most
polarizing and important debates, whether the subject
was abortion, religion or, as in the last term,
federalism.
Now the subject is race, and in no area has Justice
O'Connor played such a vital role over so many years
as in the Court's struggle over whether, and to what
purpose, the Government may ever take race into
account.
Whether the context has been the role of race in
electoral politics or the validity of set-aside programs
to steer Government business to minority contractors,
she has typically either written the opinions or cast the
deciding vote in 5-to-4 decisions to treat race-conscious
Government policies as highly suspect.
"O'Connor has rejected both of the ideologically pure
positions about race-conscious public policy, one being
that anything that overcomes the disadvantage of race
is good, and the other that taking race into account is
never appropriate," Prof. Richard H. Pildes of the
University of Michigan Law School said in an
interview. "She has been groping for an intermediate,
subtle, fine-grained position."
Now for the first time in a decade, the Justices are
about to take up the highly charged question of
affirmative action, more often portrayed as a zero-sum
game than an occasion for subtle line-drawing. People
who agree on little else about the subject are united in
the belief that the future of affirmative action may well
be in Justice O'Connor's hands.
On the last day of the term, the Court announced it
would hear an affirmative action case from a New
Jersey school district, where officials dismissed a white
teacher in order to preserve a black teacher's job.
Overshadowed by the headline-grabbing flood of
opinions in the term's final days, the Court's action has
so far received relatively little public notice.
That is about to change. Just as the last Supreme
Court term provided a stage for a searching public
inquiry into physician-assisted suicide, the case of
Piscataway Board of Education v. Taxman will most
likely be the centerpiece of the new term, doing more
to galvanize debate over affirmative action than any
Presidential speeches or commissions.
The grant of review hardly went unnoticed by
stakeholders in the affirmative action debate. In the six
years since the Bush Administration went to court on
behalf of Sharon Taxman, the dismissed white teacher
-- a position the Clinton Administration later
disavowed -- the Piscataway case has been a mirror of
the shifting political currents on the subject of race.
Advocates on both sides have watched the twists and
turns of a case that in many respects appears to put
affirmative action in the worst possible light. A
race-based layoff is a harder sell, both politically and
legally, than almost any other race-conscious policy.
So the news that this case would be the Supreme
Court's vehicle for revisiting affirmative action was
greeted with either glee or dread by those who have
viewed this case as either an opportunity or a train
wreck. Groups on both sides are working on their
briefs, no doubt tailored to win Justice O'Connor's
attention and vote.
There is a parallel: almost exactly 20 years ago, the
case of Allan Bakke, a xhite man whose effort to gain
entrance to a California state medical school was
frustrated by a policy that set aside a fixed number of
places for minorities, set off a furious public debate.
Justice O'Connor had not yet joined the Court, but
there was another Justice in the middle, Lewis F.
Powell Jr., now retired. Like Justice O'Connor, he was
a moderate conservative with an aversion to the
absolutist views on both ends of the spectrum.
With the Court otherwise split 4 to 4, Justice Powell's
separate opinion defined the Court's position. The
Bakke decision repudiated quotas but kept affirmative
action alive by endorsing the goal of student diversity
in higher education as a compelling governmental
interest. Until last year's Hopwood decision, in which
a Federal appeals court invalidated the
affirmative-action admissions program at the
University of Texas Law School in a ruling the
Supreme Court declined to review, the Bakke case
remained the law of the land. The underlying question
in the new case is whether it still is.
"For better or worse, this is the vehicle for settling
the diversity question," said Clint Bolick, president of
the Institute for Justice, a conservative public interest
law firm here that opposes affirmative action.
"O'Connor is pivotal on both the direction and distance
the Court will travel."
Would Justice O'Connor have voted as Justice Powell
did in the Bakke case? Would she vote that way today,
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given the rapidly accumulating evidence of how the
end of affirmative action in Texas and also in
California, under state policy there, is resegregating
the top public law schools? No one is sure.
Justice O'Connor "would like to have diversity, but
she doesn't want to have to talk about how you get
there," Pamela S. Karlan, a law professor and voting
rights expert at the University of Virginia, said in an
interview. "She's not at all indifferent, but she has
almost an esthetic dislike of the nasty ugliness of
taking race into account."
There are some obvious differences between the
Bakke and Piscataway cases. Allan Bakke lost an
opportunity, while Sharon Taxman lost a job, which a
majority of the Court may find unacceptable.
Bakke was a constitutional case, requiring the Court
to apply the 14' Amendment's guarantee of equal
protection of the laws to the new context of "reverse
discrimination." The Piscataway case is statutory, the
question being whether the school board's action
violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the
core Federal law that prohibits discrimination in
employment. While the Constitution is binding only on
government, Title VII applies throughout the private
sector as well, to every workplace with at least 15
employees.
The Bakke case was about diversity among students,
the Piscataway case about diversity within a faculty --
specifically, within a single high school department.
Debra Williams and Sharon Taxman were the two
junior members of the 10-teacher business department,
equally qualified and with the same seniority. But Ms.
Williams was the department's only black teacher, and
when the order came to shrink the staff by one, the
school board chose to retain her as a way of preserving
diversity. Because there was no history of
discriminatory hiring by the school board, neither side
ever tried to describe the action as a remedy for past
discrimination.
Two lower Federal courts ruled that the school board
had violated Ms. Taxman's rights under Title VII, with
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit, which sits in Philadelphia, writing broadly that
under Title VII, diversity can never be a valid rationale
for affirmative action. Only remedies for past
discrimination "can co-exist with the act's
anti-discrimination mandate," the appeals court said in
its 8-to-4 opinion last August.
Taken literally, Title VII's prohibition against
adverse employment actions on account of race would
bar nearly all policies that come under the heading of
affirmative action. But the Court has nonetheless
upheld affirmative action to alleviate a "manifest
imbalance" in a work force and to remedy an
employer's past discriminatory conduct.
In the mid-1980's, the Reagan Administration pushed
a number of affirmative action cases to the Court in an
effort to secure a ruling that would have permitted only
identifiable victims of proven acts of past
discrimination to benefit from affirmative action. The
Administration's attempt failed, in part because Justice
O'Connor, departing from the Court's other
conservatives, insisted in her separate opinions on
keeping the door open somewhat wider. How much
wider is now the question.
Her concurring opinion in a 1987 case, Johnson v.
Transportation Agency, upheld the promotion of a
woman over a marginally better-qualified man for a
public works job that no women had ever held. Citing
the extreme statistical disparity, Justice O'Connor said
the employer had "a firm basis for believing that
remedial action was required." Justice Antonin Scalia
objected in a dissenting opinion that Justice O'Connor's
position was little more than "a halfway house" on the
road to race-neutral public policies.
In a 1986 case, Wygant v. Jackson Board of
Education, Justice O'Connor agreed with the 5-to-4
majority that invalidated a public school district's
policy to protect some recently hired black teachers
against layoffs. The school district defended its policy
as necessary to remedy "societal discrimination" and to
provide black "role models." But while agreeing that
neither goal was valid in this context, Justice O'Connor
noted in her separate opinion that the case left
unresolved the validity of "the very different goal of
promoting racial diversity among the faculty." Because
the school board had not raised that question, she said,
"I do not believe it necessary to discuss the magnitude
of that interest or its applicability in this case."
The language was typical O'Connor. "She's defined
herself as a judge who decides cases," Cass Sunstein,
a law professor at the University of Chicago, said in an
interview. "She's nervous about rules and abstractions
going wrong. She's very alert to the need for the Court
to depend on the details of each case."
Justice O'Connor's frequent refusal to go further than
necessary to decide the case at hand has led some
Court watchers to predict that she will keep the Court
from using the Piscataway case to make a broad
pronouncement if the Justices are in general agreement
that the lower court can be upheld on narrower
grounds. To say that diversity did not justify dismissing
Ms. Taxman is not to decide whether diversity could
ever be an acceptable rationale.
Four members of the Court - Justices Scalia,
Clarence Thomas, Anthony M. Kennedy, and Chief
Justice William H. Rehnquist - may well want to issue
a definitive rejection of the diversity rationale, but
"they won't get her," Prof. Suzanna Sherry of the
University of Minnesota Law School predicted. "In a
case that doesn't require it, she won't reach it."
Copyright 1997, The New York Times Company
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TEACHERS UNION REITERATES SUPPORT FOR AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
The Associated Press Political Service
Saturday, July 5, 1997
Robert Greene
ATLANTA (AP) The National Education
Association has restated its support for racial and
ethnic hiring preferences in public schools, but the
union still must decide its position in a Supreme Court
case on the issue.
By voice vote Friday, the nation's largest teachers
union embraced an affirmative action policy that
advocates the use of preferences to assure diversity
among employees, not just to remedy past
discrimination.
As with other NEA policies, the new action is not
binding on local unions. But the resolution offers
guidance and offers a political statement on behalf of
its 2.3 million members.
The union has stood for affirmative action, but two
years ago it appointed a special committee to review
the policy. The vote was on the committee's
recommendations.
NEA President Bob Chase said the vote, taken at the
union's annual convention here, was important because
of the "spotlight" on affirmative action.
Congressional Republicans are pushing legislation
that would remove race and gender criteria from
federal employment, contracting and other programs.
Meantime, a case before the Supreme Court will put
the union to a test.
The court agreed last month to hear arguments
whether the Piscataway School Board in New Jersey
unlawfully laid off a white teacher to protect an equally
qualified black teacher who had been hired the same
day as the white teacher.
A lower court in the case said employers cannot
favor minorities simply to keep racial diversity in the
workplace.
"Our policies say affirmative action should be used
for that purpose," Chase told reporters on the eve of
the vote. He said union executives will have to decide
what role the NEA should play in the Supreme Court
case.
Although it is not a party to the lawsuit, the union
can file court papers giving positions.
But Friday's vote on affirmative action is not
necessarily indicative of what stance the union will
take in the New Jersey case.
The policy says the decision to use affirmative action
should be made on a case-by-case basis when the issue
is the number of ethnic minorities or women in a
building or department rather than the work force as a
whole.
In the New Jersey case, the black teacher was the
only minority in a 10-teacher business department.
However, the school district overall has an affirmative
action plan and a diverse group of employees.
The union has a particular interest in recruiting more
minorities into teaching. Surveys by the NEA and the
Education department show that only 13 percent of
America's estimated 2.6 million teachers belonged to
minorities, while a third of public school students did.
Copyright 1997, The Associated Press
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CLINTON DWERSITY PLAN FACES EROSION
SUPREME COURT AGREES TO HEAR CASE OF A RACE-BASED LAYOFF
Chicago Tribune
Saturday, June 28, 1997
Judy Peres, Washington Bureau
In a decision that could spell trouble for the Clinton
administration's affirmative action policy, the Supreme
Court on Friday agreed to hear arguments in the case
of a white teacher who was laid off because of her race.
The administration had tried to head off a judicial
showdown on this divisive topic by asking the court
this month not to hear the case. The White House said
the "unique facts" of the case made it an "inappropriate
vehicle for deciding such an important issue."
Speculation was widespread that the administration
feared the Supreme Court might further restrict the use
of affirmative action programs.
"The fact pattern here is almost guaranteed to
produce a ruling limiting the use of racial preferences
to some degree," said Steven Calabresi, a law professor
at Northwestern University. "The only question is how
much."
The case focuses on Sharon Taxman, a high school
teacher from Piscataway, N.J., who was laid off in
1989 after the school board decided to eliminate a
position in the business education department.
Taxman and Debra Williams, a black colleague,
were the two possible candidates for the ax because
they had the least seniority. The two had been hired on
the same day and were equally qualified. But because
Williams was the only minority in the department, the
board invoked its affirmative action program and gave
Taxman the pink slip.
She sued, and two federal courts ruled that her
dismissal violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act,
which outlaws workplace discrimination.
The school board defended its decision to let Taxman
go, saying it sought to maintain a minimum level of
racial diversity in its business education department.
But the courts ruled such use of race as a factor in
employment decisions was illegal: Under Title VII,
affirmative action plans are permissible only to
"remedy past discrimination" and only when they do
not "trammel the interests of non-minority employees."
The board conceded that the purpose of its
affirmative action decision was not remedial. The
percentage of black teachers employed by the board
districtwide exceeded their percentage in the qualified
labor pool.
The Clinton administration supports the view of the
Piscataway school board that remedying past
discrimination is not the only valid use of affirmative
action plans. In certain workplace situations, such as
schools and police departments, the administration
believes diversity is a compelling state interest.
A decision in the case could come in the middle of
Clinton's year-long "national conversation" on race
relations.
The president told a group of Hispanic-Americans on
Friday that he is exploring "what our legal options are"
to preserve preferential admission policies at federally
funded schools in the wake of adverse Supreme Court
decisions.
There is little hope the justices will take the
administration's view and uphold what they call
non-remedial affirmative action, at least not in the
context of dismissal.
"The likelihood is overwhelming that the practice
will be found unconstitutional," said Victor
Rosenblum, a Northwestern University political
scientist and constitutional law expert.
"Given the direction this court has been moving, any
time race is relied upon as the basis for a governmental
action, that action has to be justified through a
compelling state interest," Rosenblum said. "The court
has acknowledged that diversity can be an important
interest, but never compelling."
Affirmative action programs have been upheld in the
context of hiring and promotion, although the court
has imposed new limits in recent years. But there is no
precedent for the use of racial preferences in layoffs,
which Calabresi called a far more controversial area
because "it involves losing something you already
have."
Copyright 1997, Chicago Tribune
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OP-ED: THE SOLICITOR GENERAL TO THE RESCUE
The Washington Post
Saturday, June 21, 1997
Nat Hentoff
Some of the most ardent advocates of affirmative
action can do more harm to that increasingly
beleaguered remedy than its opponents. Deval Patrick,
for instance, when he was head of the Civil Rights
Division in the Department of Justice, devoted much
energy and passion to a case from Piscataway, N.J.
The Board of Education there, in an economy move,
was faced with two teachers of equal seniority and
ability. The board fired the white teacher and kept the
black teacher. The reason, said the board, was the need
for diversity in the business education department. The
surviving teacher was the only black in the division.
The Board of Education, however, did not claim that it
was remedying past discrimination in the faculty of the
high school as a whole, because there was no such
discrimination.
Another factor looming over the case was that the
Supreme Court had been giving very careful scrutiny to
racial preferences that would result in people losing
their jobs. It is one thing not to be hired; it is quite
another to lose a regular salary and benefits.
There was a split around the country as to whether
affirmative action was going too far when it resulted in
letting go a teacher solely because she was the wrong
color. And there was division in the Justice
Department. One of the critics, on constitutional
grounds, was Walter Dellinger, then an assistant
attorney general for the Office of Legal Counsel. I've
known Dellinger through the years, and he deserves the
sometimes loosely bestowed title of constitutional
scholar. He is also a careful student of the Supreme
Court.
The Piscataway case eventually went to the 3rd
Circuit Court of Appeals, which, last August, ruled
against the Piscataway Board of Education,
emphasizing that "unless an affirmative action plan has
a remedial purpose [to deal with specific proven
discrimination]," it is in violation of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act. And such an affirmative action plan,
said the court, should not "unnecessarily trammel the
interests" of non-minority employees.
The 3rd Circuit's decision was not unexpected,
because the Piscataway case was weak from the start,
though not to Deval Patrick and his supporters.
Nonetheless the school board has appealed the 3 rd
Circuit opinion to the Supreme Court. A member of the
Justice Department told Nina Totenberg of National
Public Radio: "We couldn't win this case if our lives
depended on it."
In January, the Supreme Court asked the Justice
Department for its analysis of the case. By now, Walter
Dellinger was the acting solicitor general, and the
friend-of-the-court brief to the court is essentially his.
Dellinger disagrees with the idea that there should
never be an affirmative/diversity plan unless its intent
is to remedy previous proven discrimination.
There are times and places, he notes in the brief,
when, for instance, "against the backdrop of racial
unrest, a diverse police force may be essential to secure
the public support and cooperation that is necessary for
preventing and solving crime." So too, he says, there
can be a compelling particular need for a diverse work
force in prisons.
But the 3rd Circuit had ruled out any such
non-remedial use of race. If this weak case were to be
judged by the Supreme Court, it is very likely the Board
of Education would lose and the broad 3' Circuit
prohibition of any non-remedial use of race would
become the law of the land.
It is evident from Walter Dellinger's brief that he
does agree with the 3rd Circuit that the firing of the
white teacher was wrong. The case, he says, is "an
unrepresentative example of non-remedial, affirmative
action in employment," since it is not school-wide.
Furthermore, the school, though it had had an
affirmative action policy for 18 years, had used it only
once and eventually got rid of it altogether.
Accordingly, the school has had exceedingly limited
experience with affirmative action.
The advice to the Supreme Court by Dellinger is to
not take the Piscataway case. But he emphasizes in the
brief that the 3rd Circuit made a "serious misreading of
Title VII and its purposes" when it ruled there can be
no non-remedial affirmative action in any case.
If the Supreme Court accepts Dellinger's advice, he
will have saved the possibility of using race as a factor
under certain non-remedial conditions. But if the
ardent paladin of affirmative action, Deval Patrick, had
prevailed, that window would have been closed
throughout the country. It will be interesting to see
whether some of Dellinger's critics, including those in
the Justice Department, will openly recognize what he
has done for the faith. A benison from Jesse Jackson
would be in keeping.
Copyright 1997, The Washington Post Co.
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JUSTICE DEPT. SHIFTS STANCE IN BIAS CASE;
BUT AFFIRMATIVE ACTION STELL PUSHED IN PRINCIPLE
The Washington Post
Friday, August 22, 1997
Joan Biskupic and John F. Harris
The Clinton administration has decided that the
actions of a New Jersey school board are not legally
defensible but will urge the Supreme Court to uphold
the basic principle of affirmative action that caused the
board to lay off a white teacher to keep an equally
qualified black teacher.
The legal brief in the Piscataway, N.J., case, expected
to be filed Monday, is the latest twist in a case that has
tormented the administration for three years. While
language in the brief was still being negotiated
yesterday, Justice Department and other sources said
the administration will reverse course and assert that
the New Jersey school board failed to prove the need
for racial diversity in a high school business education
department.
The case is widely considered the most important
one coming before the Supreme Court next term. The
dispute could be used to set an important new standard
for affirmative action in the workplace by laying out
the circumstances under which employers, public and
private alike, could use race-based policies.
The high-profile controversy began in 1989 when the
Piscataway school board, in the midst of a financial
crunch, told a teacher in its business department,
Sharon Taxman, that she would be laid off so that the
school could keep the only black teacher in the
department, Debra Williams. Both women had been
hired on the same day nine years earlier.
During the Bush administration, the federal
government backed the white teacher, but then
switched sides after President Clinton took office and
supported the school board. Last June, the
administration urged the Supreme Court not to take
the case at all, a position that left the administration in
the awkward position of supporting a lower court
ruling that went against the school board.
Now, it appears ready to say that while broader
principles of affirmative action should prevail, the
school board's action is indefensible.
The impending change highlights what many current
and former administration officials think was a
mistake in the first place - getting involved in what
they believe is a case with facts that are unlikely to
ever be repeated and in circumstances that are
politically indefensible.
"Having a job is different than wanting a job. Being
hired is different than being fired," said a former
administration official.
Senior officials said yesterday that there has been no
philosophical shift: The administration still supports
the goals of achieving workplace diversity through
affirmative action, just not in the way Piscataway
officials went about it.
In essence, what the brief will try to do is present a
way for the Supreme Court to rule narrowly on the
case, rejecting the school board's actions but
supporting the broad principles of affirmative action
that lay behind it.
In the case of Piscataway, for example, the school
never demonstrated what social goal would be
achieved by having a diverse business education
department. The lower court ruling at issue in the case
said the 1964 Civil Rights Act allows race-based
preferences only to redress past discrimination.
Solicitor General Walter Dellinger, who is writing
the administration's brief, has contended that
affirmative action can be justified not only as a remedy
to past discrimination but as a route to racial diversity.
In education, practices aimed at diversity could be
justified for the enrichment of the academic
experience. On police forces, it could be a better
relationship with an integrated community.
But Dellinger, who along with White House counsel
Charles F.C. Ruff has played a key role in determining
the language of the brief, has long argued that the
Piscataway layoff could not be defended, both because
the school board had not formally justified its reasons
for diversity at the departmental level and because
race-based layoffs, as opposed to hiring or promotion
decisions, require an especially heavy burden of
justification.
David B. Rubin, a lawyer representing the
Piscataway school board, said yesterday he was
disappointed by information he had heard about the
Justice Department backing away from his client's
position. "I don't understand politically what they get
doing that," he said. "This case has been an
embarrassment for the administration. They are
double-flip-flopping back again."
Justice Department lawyers face a court that has been
increasingly suspicious of race-based policies, most
recently in the creation of voting districts and public
contracting programs. The high court has never ruled
that affirmative action could be used only in the
context of past discrimination, but the justices have set
a higher bar for its use in layoffs. The court has
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distinguished between an employer's hiring a minority
worker out of a large pool of applicants and laying off
one particular white person to preserve a black person's
job. The latter situation is much more likely to infringe
on the white worker's rights.
In a key 1986 case, the court ruled unconstitutional
an affirmative action plan voluntarily adopted by a
school board, under which white teachers with more
seniority were laid off to save the jobs of newly hired
black teachers. The court said the plan was adopted
without any showing that the school board had
previously discriminated against black teachers.
Since they first became involved in the Piscataway
case, administration officials have argued over its
merits. The 1994 switch to support the school board
was pushed by Deval L. Patrick, then assistant attorney
general for civil rights. Now a lawyer in private
practice in Boston, Patrick said yesterday that he still
thinks the board position should be defended.
"Sometimes you have to fight the battle you're in, not
the battle you want it to be. If you believe that race can
be a consideration when an employer is taking all
factors into account, then you have to allow for the
possibility that all other factors are going to be equal."
But a former administration official who was
involved in deliberations in 1994 said yesterday, "It's
the ultimate Vietnam story: You have to burn the case
in order to save the policy."
Copyright 1997, The Washington Post Co.
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